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ABSTRACT
In the late 1960s and through the 1970s, the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) undertook an ambitious program of reforms.
Among other measures, the agency expanded the focus of antitrust
enforcement to address economic concentration, including the use of
Section 5 of the FTC Act to restructure dominant firms and oligopo-
lies. In many ways Michael Pertschuk, who chaired the agency from
1977 to 1981, became the symbol of the FTC’s efforts to stretch the
boundaries of antitrust policy—to pursue a conception of “competi-
tion policy in its broadest sense.” Despite a number of valuable
accomplishments, the FTC achieved relatively few litigation
successes, and its efforts aroused political opposition that nearly
crippled the institution. The experience of the FTC in the 1970s, and
during the Pertschuk chairmanship in particular, offers insights into
the implications of future efforts to use the FTC to carry out a
sweeping redesign and expansion of U.S. competition policy.
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INTRODUCTION
Among competition and consumer protection regulators, the U.S.
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is perhaps the most intriguing.
The FTC’s extraordinarily elastic mandate—including the power to
ban “unfair methods of competition”1 and “unfair or deceptive acts
or practices,”2 and its diverse portfolio of policy making tools3—gives
the FTC a seemingly unmatched capacity to study and remedy a
multitude of economic problems.4 Since the FTC’s creation in 1914,
these institutional features have placed the agency in the center of
debates about the future of U.S. competition and consumer protec-
tion policy.5
Today the FTC is again in the spotlight. Various commentators
have urged that the FTC dramatically expand its efforts to apply its
distinctive powers.6 The suggested agenda for the FTC includes
measures to reduce excessive levels of industrial concentration, to
arrest abusive behavior by dominant enterprises, to protect the
interests of small and medium enterprises, and to achieve a range
of social policy objectives beyond the promotion of economic
efficiency.7 To some observers, the FTC’s scalable mandate makes
1. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2012).
2. Id.
3. See, e.g., id. § 57a (granting the FTC the power to prescribe rules and policy state-
ments).
4. See id. § 46(a)-(f) (granting the FTC the power to collect and publish information from
individuals, partnerships, and corporations); supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
5. See generally DANIEL A. CRANE, THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT (2011) (discussing the agency’s actual and potential role in formulating U.S.
competition policy). For information on the FTC’s creation and the expectations that
surrounded its formation in the early twentieth century, see Marc Winerman, The Origins of
the FTC: Concentration, Cooperation, Control, and Competition, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 58-92
(2003).
6. See, e.g., Sandeep Vaheesan, Resurrecting “A Comprehensive Charter of Economic
Liberty”: The Latent Power of the Federal Trade Commission, 19 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 645 (2017);
Lina Khan, How to Reboot the FTC, POLITICO (Apr. 13, 2016, 5:35 AM), https://www.politico.
com/agenda/story/2016/04/ftc-antitrust-economy-monopolies-000090 [https://perma.cc/YLD8-
62JY] (“Over the past century, the Federal Trade Commission has never been as vital as it
is today.... As mergers reach record highs and Internet platforms amass greater unchecked
power over our political economy, the FTC’s competition mandate has never been more vital.
Let’s hope it seizes the opportunity for reform.”).
7. See, e.g., Khan, supra note 6 (encouraging the FTC to take three reform measures to
achieve these goals).
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it the preferred vehicle for a fundamental reorientation of competi-
tion and consumer protection policy.8
In the late 1960s and in the 1970s, similar calls for action helped
spur ambitious applications of the FTC’s competition and consumer
protection powers.9 As the FTC’s chairman from May 1977 to
February 1981, Michael Pertschuk exemplified the FTC’s determi-
nation to exercise the full potential inherent in its mandate.10
Pertschuk came to the FTC after a long, influential career as a
congressional staffer.11 As FTC chairman, he urged the Commission
to embrace a view of “competition ... in its broadest sense” and to
apply the agency’s powers expansively.12
The program conceived by Pertschuk and his predecessors at the
FTC in the late 1960s and in the 1970s was breathtaking in its aims
and means. The agency achieved some litigation and rulemaking
successes, and introduced policies that have had enduring value.13
8. See id. (“Reforming the FTC to meet current challenges does not require any act of
Congress. But it does require a bold leadership willing to use the full breadth of its expansive
authority.”).
9. The transformation of the FTC since the late 1960s is a major focus of a collection of
essays produced in conjunction with a symposium celebrating the agency’s 90th anniversary
in 2004, and a symposium convened by the George Washington Law Review to commemorate
the agency’s 100th anniversary in 2014. See Federal Trade Commission 90th Anniversary
Symposium, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 745 (2005); Symposium, The FTC at 100: Centennial
Commemorations and Proposals for Progress, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1835 (2015). Essays from
these collections that focus on the catalytic effect of calls for reform made in the late 1960s
include Edward F. Cox, Reinvigorating the FTC: The Nader Report and the Rise of Consumer
Advocacy, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 899 (2005); David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Can’t Anyone
Here Play This Game? Judging the FTC’s Critics, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1948 (2015); Sidney
M. Milkis, The Federal Trade Commission and Consumer Protection: Regulatory Chance and
Administrative Pragmatism, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 911 (2005).
10. For more information about Pertschuk’s chairmanship of the FTC, see RICHARD A.
HARRIS & SIDNEY M. MILKIS, THE POLITICS OF REGULATORY CHANGE: A TALE OF TWO AGENCIES
154-86 (2d ed. 1996); PHILIP B. HEYMANN, THE POLITICS OF PUBLIC MANAGEMENT 27-41 (1987).
For Pertschuk’s own reflections on his experiences at the FTC, see generally MICHAEL
PERTSCHUK, REVOLT AGAINST REGULATION (1982).
11. Pertschuk recounts his career as a legislative staff member, including his tenure as
a Senate Commerce Committee staffer and an advisor to the Commerce Committee’s
Chairman, Warren Magnuson, in MICHAEL PERTSCHUK, WHEN THE SENATE WORKED FOR US:
THE INVISIBLE ROLE OF STAFFERS IN COUNTERING CORPORATE LOBBIES 1-8 (2017).
12. See Michael Pertschuk, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks Before the Eleventh
New England Antitrust Conference 20 (Nov. 18, 1977); see also infra notes 184-200 and
accompanying text (describing Pertschuk’s agenda for the FTC).
13. See, e.g., infra Part III (describing successful FTC programs that originated in the late
1970s).
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At the same time, the FTC’s program of the 1970s generated many
failed cases and rules.14 FTC efforts to explore the outer limits of its
powers elicited powerful political backlash that threatened a major
curtailment of the agency’s jurisdiction.15
This Article examines Michael Pertschuk’s leadership of the FTC
for several purposes. This Article uses this era to consider the policy
implementation difficulties that an “independent” regulatory agency
faces when it seeks to apply a powerful, flexible policy mandate.16
This Article also studies the institutional prerequisites for such an
agency to apply this mandate effectively.17 These predicates include
an awareness of the broader political and economic context in
which the agency operates, the development of sound methods to
set priorities and choose specific projects, and the establishment
of effective processes to match an agency’s commitments to its ca-
pabilities.18 In doing these things, the Article suggests implications
of the FTC’s 1970s experience for modern proposals that would have
the FTC undertake a far-reaching expansion of its existing law
enforcement and regulatory programs.19
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the FTC pol-
icymaking status quo when Pertschuk became chair in 1977. This
Part traces the causes and content of the sweeping redirection of
FTC programs that began in the late 1960s and carried forward
until Pertschuk came to the agency in May 1977.
Part II sets out how Pertschuk defined his agenda in 1977.
Pertschuk presented the basic ingredients of his program in two
speeches delivered late in 1977.20 The speeches provide essential
foundations for understanding the evolution of modern U.S.
competition and consumer protection policy.
14. See infra Part IV (describing policy failures of FTC programs originating in the 1970s).
15. See infra Parts IV.A-B (describing congressional backlash to FTC programs from
1970s).
16. See infra Part IV.C.
17. See infra Part IV.C.
18. See infra Part IV.C.
19. See infra Part V.
20. See Pertschuk, supra note 12; Michael Pertschuk, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n,
Remarks Before the Annual Meeting of the Section on Antitrust and Economic Regulation of
the Association of American Law Schools (Dec. 27, 1977).
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Part III describes how the FTC sought to realize Pertschuk’s
vision from 1977 until March 1981, when President Ronald Reagan
appointed David Clanton to serve as the agency’s acting chairman.
Part IV critically assesses the FTC’s experience in the 1970s. The
Article does not evaluate the economic effects of the agency’s
program during this period. Instead, it focuses on the quality of the
FTC’s program from an institutional perspective. It emphasizes two
institutional flaws: a failure to ensure that the agency had the
capacity to successfully carry out its ambitious agenda, and a failure
to account for how the FTC’s projects would land in an increasingly
hostile political environment. Among other developments, this
discussion also recounts congressional moves from 1979 through the
early 1980s to curb the FTC’s antitrust and consumer protection
authority.
Part V turns to the potential implications of the FTC’s experience
in the 1970s for modern debates about possible adjustments to
antitrust law and policy. Drawing upon modern commentary, Part
V sketches what a far-reaching program to reorient and expand the
FTC’s antitrust and consumer protection programs might look like.
Part V does not assess the substantive wisdom of proposals for FTC
policy reforms. Instead, it uses the institutional perspective set out
in Part IV to consider how the agency might fare in seeking to
implement a bolder program of enforcement, notably measures to
break up concentrated industries.
The story of the FTC in the 1970s reveals phenomena that ought
to inform contemporary discussions about the purposes and content
of U.S. competition and consumer protection policy. This Article
chiefly examines the FTC’s experience, but it also notes parallel
developments in the antitrust progam of the Department of Justice
(DOJ). Despite its U.S.-centric orientation, the story has things for
other jurisdictions to ponder, as well.
I. MAKEOVER: THE FTC FROM 1969 TO THE PERTSCHUK
CHAIRMANSHIP
In the late 1960s and through the 1970s, the FTC undertook a
sweeping overhaul of its competition and consumer protection
programs. Two highly critical studies of the agency set the reforms
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in motion. In early 1969, Ralph Nader’s organization published a
caustic evaluation of the agency, focusing chiefly on its consumer
protection programs.21 Publication of the Nader study led President
Richard Nixon to request the American Bar Association (ABA) to
carry out its own inquiry.22 Later in 1969, an ABA-sponsored blue
ribbon panel issued a report that largely echoed the Nader study’s
dismal assessment, albeit in less flamboyant terms.23 The following
Section reviews the Nader and ABA studies and discusses their
significance for the FTC’s work in the 1970s.24
A. The Nader and ABA Reports
Taken together, four aspects of the Nader and ABA studies stand
out, because they shaped expectations about what the FTC had to
do to redeem itself and justify its continued existence. First, both
studies depicted the agency as being an appallingly bad institution.
The Nader study relentlessly criticized the FTC’s work, suggesting
that only by chance did the FTC occasionally stumble into doing
something that advanced consumer interests.25 The ABA panel more
generously recognized positive FTC accomplishments,26 but sug-
gested that these appeared as rare oases in a desert of ineptitude,
sloth, and timidity.27
Second, both reports blamed several causes; chief among them the
FTC’s obsession with trivial cases.28 Both groups scolded the agency
for spending massive consumer protection resources on policing the
labeling requirements for furs and textiles.29 On the antitrust side,
21. EDWARD F. COX ET AL., ‘THE NADER REPORT’ ON THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
(1969).
22. For more information on the history of the ABA study, see Hyman & Kovacic, supra
note 9, at 1953-54.
23. See AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ABA COMMISSION TO STUDY THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION 34-35 (1969).
24. See infra Part I.A.
25. See COX ET AL., supra note 21, at 37-39.
26. See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 23, at 65, 68-69 (noting FTC’s contributions to the
development of U.S. merger policy).
27. See id. at 1 (“Through lack of effective direction, the FTC has failed to establish goals
and priorities, to provide necessary guidance to its staff, and to manage the flow of its work
in an efficient and expeditious manner.”).
28. See id. at 25-26; COX ET AL., supra note 21, at 44-45.
29. See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 23, at 26; COX ET AL., supra note 21, at 47-48.
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the ABA damned the FTC for its preoccupation with Robinson-
Patman enforcement to the exclusion of other, more worthy pur-
suits, such as challenges to vertical contractual restraints.30 The
preoccupation with the trivial stemmed from a basic failure to
devise internal policy planning and priority setting mechanisms to
focus resources on matters of true economic significance.31 Grave
weaknesses in senior leadership and the professional staff likewise
denied the FTC the talent it needed to function effectively.32
Third, both reports featured a notably scathing tone. The Nader
report dripped with contempt. In a chapter titled “The Cancer,” the
Nader report observed: “Misguided leadership is the malignant
cancer that has already assumed control of the Commission, that
has been silently destroying it, and that has spread its contagion on
the growing crisis of the American consumer.”33 In another passage,
the Nader report used words such as “corruption” and “collusion” to
describe the agency’s relationship with businesses under its
supervision.34 In his preface to the study, Nader said the FTC was
“a self-parody of bureaucracy, fat with cronyism, torpid through an
inbreeding unusual even for Washington, manipulated by the
agents of commercial predators, impervious to governmental and
citizen monitoring.”35 Even the FTC’s headquarters building took it
on the chin: the Nader group observed that “the architect of the
Federal Trade Commission building had a genius for sensing the
mediocre.”36
The ABA panel’s language was more prosaic than the Nader
report, but its dreary recital of FTC failures conveyed a similar
sense of institutional decay. The ABA panel documented major
deficiencies in the FTC’s competition and consumer programs, and
recounted grave weaknesses in the agency’s operational procedures
(for example, for setting priorities) and leadership.37 Richard
Posner’s dissent from the panel’s recommendations was more
30. See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 23, at 67-68.
31. See id. at 77-81.
32. See, e.g., id. at 32-33.
33. COX ET AL., supra note 21, at 127, 130.
34. Id. at 121.
35. Id. at vii.
36. Id. at 4.
37. See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 23, at 34-35.
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pointed and less generous.38 In a subsequent law review article, he
recommended shutting down the agency.39
A fourth criticism appears most clearly in the ABA report. The
ABA study reviewed earlier evaluations of the FTC, and perceived
a powerful institutional resistance to needed reforms dating back to
the agency’s first decade.40 The ABA’s reading of past commentary
indicated the persistence of the same flaws over time.41 These
included “the absence of effective planning and failure to establish
workable priorities, the consequent tendency to become involved in
too many trivial cases, the delay and unnecessary secrecy in FTC
operations, and the uneven quality of staff.”42
Rather than dismantle the agency and allocate its duties to other
government bodies, the ABA panel recommended that Congress give
the FTC one last chance to demonstrate its worth.43 As an antitrust
policymaker, the FTC needed to focus resources on “difficult and
complex antitrust questions,”44 leaving enforcement of well-estab-
lished, per se rules of illegality to the DOJ.45 The redirection of effort
would entail, among other means, a substantial curtailment of
Robinson-Patman Act enforcement, which the FTC had made the
centerpiece of its antitrust program in the 1950s and 1960s.46 The
new FTC would focus chiefly on matters “where issues of anticom-
petitive effects turn essentially on complicated economic analysis,
and where decided cases ha[d] not yet succeeded in fashioning a
clear line marking the boundary between legal and illegal con-
duct.”47
38. See generally id. at 92-119 (stating that the ABA Committee’s report was a “missed
opportunity” and only examined “the surfaces of problems”).
39. See Richard A. Posner, The Federal Trade Commission, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 47, 89
(1969) (“On what evidence we have, the costs of having a [F]ederal [T]rade [C]ommission
appear to exceed the benefits.”).
40. See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 23, at 9-11.
41. See id. at 9.
42. Id.
43. See id. at 3.
44. Id. at 64.
45. See id. at 66.
46. See Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 9, at 1957-59 (describing ABA’s proposed rede-
ployment of FTC resources away from Robinson-Patman Act enforcement).
47. AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 23, at 66.
1278 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:1269
1. Institutional Implications of the Suggested Reforms
The ABA and Nader recommendations came with a major catch.
The depiction of an agency so obdurate in its decades-long commit-
ment to a program of economic insignificance,48 punctuated only by
occasional projects of genuine value,49 suggested that the proof that
the FTC had undertaken needed reforms would have to come in the
form of dramatic enhancements in the FTC’s program.50 This would
require the FTC to replace trivial matters with matters of the
highest economic importance; swap out the repetitive application of
well-settled legal principles for imaginative, pathbreaking cases
that addressed unsettled areas of the law; and set aside timid,
unimaginative matters in favor of bold, creative initiatives that
exercised the full range of the agency’s authority.51 Big, visible,
innovative applications of the FTC’s powers would be essential to
the agency’s continued existence.52 If the FTC could be likened to a
movie production company, its merit would be measured by its
capacity to turn out blockbusters—lots of them, and quickly.
How was the FTC to accomplish such an extraordinary turn-
around? A fundamental retooling of the institution would be
necessary. The ABA and Nader studies documented severe weak-
nesses in the FTC’s operational methods and human talent.53 Faulty
planning induced a preoccupation with trivial matters and denied
the agency the ability to set meaningful priorities and select projects
to achieve them.54 Poor case management and sclerotic procedures
caused “crippling delay[s]” in carrying out projects.55 Years of
uneven appointments to senior leadership positions, and uninspired
staff-level recruiting that deliberately targeted weak candidates
whom other employers would not be tempted to poach, created
48. See supra notes 28-32, 40-42 and accompanying text.
49. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
50. See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 23, at 3.
51. See, e.g., id., at 2-3; supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
52. See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 23, at 2-3; supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
53. See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 23, at 77-84; COX ET AL., supra note 21, at 87.
54. AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 23, at 34. For example, the ABA panel said poor planning
“caused a misallocation of funds and personnel to trivial matters rather than to matters of
pressing public concern.” Id. at 1.
55. Id. at 34.
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serious talent deficits.56 In order to revitalize its substantive pro-
gram, the FTC needed to dramatically upgrade its internal decision-
making processes and workforce.57 The anticipated institutional
makeover would require the agency to rebuild the house and live in
it at the same time.
2. Deconcentration: A Focal Point for Expanded Enforcement
At the time of the Nader and ABA studies, economic concentra-
tion had emerged as a difficult, unsettled, and highly significant
competition law issue—the very type that the ABA report envi-
sioned the FTC asserting its powers over. From the mid-1940s
through the 1960s, a large body of commentary argued that
competition policy had failed grievously to deal effectively with
economic concentration.58 The literature said that, to a growing
degree, dominant enterprises and tight oligopolies gripped the
American economy.59
In 1945, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s ruling
in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa) seemed to open
possibilities for the broader application of the Sherman Act to attack
industrial concentration.60 In 1947, two articles published in the
same issue of the University of Chicago Law Review—one authored
by Edward Levi and the other by Eugene Rostow—seized upon
Alcoa to call for renewed federal enforcement to attack industrial
concentration.61 To both authors, the urgency for a basic redirection
56. See id. at 32-34 (finding “too many instances of incompetence in the agency,
particularly in senior staff positions”); COX ET AL., supra note 21, at 101-26 (criticizing the
quality of the FTC’s leadership and staff).
57. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
58. See William E. Kovacic, Failed Expectations: The Troubled Past and Uncertain Future
of the Sherman Act as a Tool for Deconcentration, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1105, 1105 & n.4 (1989).
59. See id. at 1122-23.
60. 148 F.2d 416, 448 (2d Cir. 1945). The Second Circuit served as the court of last resort
in the case because recusals had denied the Supreme Court a quorum to hear the appeal. For
more information on Alcoa’s significance, see Kovacic, supra note 58, at 1117-19, 1132-33;
Marc Winerman & William E. Kovacic, Learned Hand, Alcoa, and the Reluctant Application
of the Sherman Act, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 295 (2013).
61. See Edward H. Levi, The Antitrust Laws and Monopoly, 14 U. CHI. L. REV. 153 (1947);
Eugene V. Rostow, The New Sherman Act: A Positive Instrument of Progress, 14 U. CHI. L.
REV. 567, 568 (1947). The role of Levi and Rostow in shaping the debate about industrial
concentration in the post-World War II era is recounted in Kovacic, supra note 58, at 1134-35,
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of U.S. competition policy was clear. A prominent academic, Levi
later became Attorney General during the administration of Pres-
ident Gerald Ford.62 In his article, he warned:
It is doubtful if a free and competitive society can be maintained
if the direction of concentration is to continue.... If the concen-
tration problem in this country is to be dealt with by measures
themselves not incompatible with free enterprise, it is probable
that the hope lies in the new interpretation of the Sherman Act
and an increased awareness of the responsibility of the courts to
give adequate relief.63
Rostow’s article elaborated upon the same themes. High levels of
concentration undermined economic performance: “There is a great
deal of evidence ... that on the whole Big Business is less efficient,
less progressive technically, and relatively less profitable than
smaller business.”64 No less important was the danger that indus-
trial concentration posed to the nation’s broader social and political
health.65 Rostow said:
One of the major problems requiring a social decision in our time
is whether we could achieve a wider dispersal of power and
opportunity, and a broader base for the class structure of our
society, by a more competitive organization of industry and
trade, in smaller and more independent units.66
He added that “[i]t should be easier to achieve the values of
democracy in a society where economic power and social status are
more widely distributed, and less concentrated, than in the United
States today.”67
Commentary from the 1940s through the 1960s acknowledged
that from time to time since 1890, federal enforcement officials had
mounted campaigns to dissolve positions of individual and shared
1135 n.190.
62. See Kovacic, supra note 58, at 1135 n.190.
63. Levi, supra note 61, at 183.
64. Rostow, supra note 61, at 568.
65. See id. at 569-70.
66. Id. at 569.
67. Id. at 570.
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dominance.68 This literature contained a persistent theme that the
government had gained few victories of true importance in seeking
to deconcentrate industries dominated by a single firm or a small
collection of firms.69 Many commentators considered this lapse to be
the single-greatest failure of the U.S. system and an urgent priority
for correction.70 One of the most powerful proposals for a redirection
of policy appeared in 1959 with the publication of Donald Turner’s
and Carl Kaysen’s book Antitrust Policy, which provided the most
influential synthesis of the economics and law of competition policy
of its time.71 Kaysen and Turner said, “The principal defect of
present antitrust law is its inability to cope with market power
created by jointly acting oligopolists.”72 Kaysen and Turner proposed
new legislation that would restructure industries whose concentra-
tion exceeded certain thresholds.73
In 1969, when the Nader and ABA studies appeared, the case for
a new program to reduce economic concentration received a boost
from a blue ribbon panel convened by President Lyndon Johnson.74
68. See Kovacic, supra note 58, at 1105 & n.3.
69. Walter Adams provided an influential treatment of this theme in Walter Adams,
Dissolution, Divorcement, Divestiture: The Pyrrhic Victories of Antitrust, 27 IND. L.J. 1 (1951).
Owing to weaknesses in remedies obtained in Sherman Act monopolization cases, Adams said,
“the Government ... has won many a law suit but lost many a cause.” Id. at 31. Among other
initiatives, Adams concluded that the famed Department of Justice suits against Standard
Oil Co. and American Tobacco Co. in the first two decades of the twentieth century yielded
feeble remedial outcomes. See id. at 2. For other contemporary contributions that took a
similarly gloomy view of the U.S. deconcentration experience, see STAFF OF THE S. TEMP.
NAT’L ECON. COMM., 76TH CONG., INVESTIGATION OF CONCENTRATION OF ECONOMIC POWER:
A STUDY OF THE CONSTRUCTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS 84
(Comm. Print 1941) (authored by Milton Handler) (“It is common knowledge ... that the
[monopolization dissolution] decrees have rarely succeeded in restoring competition.”);
DONALD DEWEY, MONOPOLY IN ECONOMICS AND LAW 247 (1959) (“Taken together the so-called
big cases fought by the antitrust agencies in the last twenty years reveal a pattern of ‘legal
victory-economic defeat.’”); Rostow, supra note 61, at 570. 
70. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
71. CARL KAYSEN & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL
ANALYSIS (1959). On the importance of Kaysen and Turner in contemporary discussions of
competition law, see Frederick M. Rowe, The Decline of Antitrust and the Delusions of Models:
The Faustian Pact of Law and Economics, 72 GEO. L.J. 1511, 1522 n.64 (1984).
72. KAYSEN & TURNER, supra note 71, at 110.
73. See id. at 110-19, 261-66.
74. See Phil C. Neal et al., Report of the White House Task Force on Antitrust Policy,
ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV., Winter 1968-69, at 11, 20-30. For more information on the
formation and recommendations of the Neal Task Force Report, see generally Herbert
Hovenkamp, Introduction to The Neal Report and the Crisis in Antitrust, COMPETITION POL’Y
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Known as the White House Task Force on Antitrust Policy, and
chaired by Dean Phil Neal of the University of Chicago Law School,
the group proposed a threefold strategy: expand the DOJ’s and
FTC’s enforcement of the existing antitrust laws against dominant
firms and tight oligopolies, police mergers more aggressively, and
adopt new legislation to deconcentrate U.S. industry.75 The Neal
report helped frame expectations for the FTC makeover that the
Nader and ABA studies demanded.76 Some component of the FTC’s
competition program would have to include measures to address the
problem of industrial concentration.77
B. The FTC’s Antitrust Agenda Before the Pertschuk
Chairmanship
Congress embraced the Nader and ABA studies’ damning
assessments of the FTC, and used the ABA report as a blueprint for
reorienting the FTC’s competition programs.78 Echoing the ABA
panel’s “one last chance” warning,79 some key legislators said the
agency’s continued existence depended on a sweeping overhaul.80 At
an FTC oversight hearing convened on the day the ABA panel
issued its report, Senator Edward Kennedy said the time had come
for the FTC to correct longstanding flaws, or “to consider abolishing
the agency and starting it from the ground again.”81
The FTC got the message. From late 1969 until Michael
Petschuk’s arrival to chair the agency in May 1977, the FTC
undertook a variety of new competition and consumer protection
INT’L, Spring 2009, at 217; Kovacic, supra note 58, at 1119, 1137.
75. See Neal et al., supra note 74, at 14-17.
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. See William E. Kovacic, The Federal Trade Commission and Congressional Oversight
of Antitrust Enforcement, 17 TULSA L.J. 587, 630-31 (1982) (describing congressional
endorsement of the ABA’s views about appropriate future direction of the FTC competition
program). Leading members of Congress gave prominent and favorable attention to the Nader
Report when it was released in 1969. Id. at 593 & n.16.
79. See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 23, at 3.
80. See Kovacic, supra note 78, at 630-31.
81. Federal Trade Commission Procedures: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Admin.
Practice & Procedures of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong. 110 (1969) (remarks of
Sen. Edward Kennedy, Chairman, Subcomm. on Admin. Practice & Procedures of the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary).
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programs that responded to criticism from the ABA commission, the
Nader study, and Congress.82 Sketched below are some of the most
notable elements of the agency’s policy agenda in this period. This
Section focuses on new competition cases initiated from 1969
onward,83 and identifies selected respects in which the agency
sought to formulate competition policy with tools other than
litigation.84 This Section emphasizes competition-related matters,
and Part I.C briefly identifies important consumer protection
initiatives that represented new directions in agency policy.85
This Section does not survey the FTC’s work comprehensively.
Instead, it captures highlights of the nonmerger competition
program that was underway at the FTC when Pertshuck became
chairman in 1977. This Section provides context for the discussion
in Part II, below, which reviews Pertschuk’s speeches in Boston and
Atlanta late in 1977. In particular, this Section provides a basis for
assessing Pertschuk’s claim that federal antitrust enforcement
policy (including the work of the FTC) had performed poorly due to
a lack of ambition, frail political will, and a faulty understanding of
the aims of competition law.
1. Concentrated Industries: Dominant Firms and Collective
Dominance
One set of FTC cases that were filed between 1969 through 1976
addressed exclusionary conduct by dominant firms. The Commission
initiated predatory pricing cases against the largest U.S. bread
producer (IT&T),86 the leading U.S. instant coffee producer (General
Foods),87 and the largest U.S. reprocessed lemon juice producer
82. See HARRIS & MILKIS, supra note 10, at 140-224 (reviewing FTC consumer protection
reforms in the early 1970s); Kovacic, supra note 78, at 643-51 (describing FTC antitrust
reforms undertaken from 1969 through 1976); William MacLeod et al., Three Rules and a
Constitution: Consumer Protection Finds Its Limits in Competition Policy, 72 ANTITRUST L.J.
943, 951-54 (2005) (describing FTC consumer protection rulemaking activity between 1969
and 1977).
83. See infra Parts I.B.
84. See, e.g., infra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
85. See infra Part I.C.
86. Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 104 F.T.C. 280, 280-86 (1984) (describing the FTC’s 1974
complaint).
87. Gen. Foods Corp., 103 F.T.C. 204, 204-08 (1984) (describing the FTC’s 1976
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(Borden).88 In this period, the agency settled a monopolization claim
against the largest plain-paper photocopier manufacturer (Xerox),89
prosecuted the largest citrus fruits producer (Sunkist) for various
exclusionary practices,90 sued the largest U.S. automobile manufac-
turer (General Motors) for attempting to monopolize the distribution
of crash parts,91 and prosecuted the principal airline service
directories publisher for a refusal to deal (Reuben Donnelley).92
A second category of cases dealing with concentrated sectors
involved allegations of collective dominance. The FTC brought two
matters that became known as “shared monopoly” cases.93 In one
matter, the agency challenged the four leading U.S. ready-to-eat
breakfast cereal producers (Kellogg, General Mills, General Foods,
and Quaker).94 In the other, the FTC sued the eight leading U.S.
petroleum refiners (Exxon, Mobil, Gulf, Texaco, Atlantic Richfield,
Amoco, Chevron, and Shell).95 The FTC also brought a conspiracy to
monopolize case against the three leading automobile rental
companies (Hertz, Avis, and National) for excluding rivals from the
best airport rental locations.96
As it was litigating cases, the FTC sought to build a stronger
empirical foundation for analyzing the performance of individual
sectors. The FTC’s leading initiative, the line-of-business program,
used the agency’s information-gathering powers to issue ques-
tionnaires to individual firms.97 The program had a number of
possible applications, but one of its main purposes was to identify
complaint).
88. Borden Inc., 92 F.T.C. 669, 669-72 (1978) (describing the FTC’s 1974 complaint), aff’d,
674 F.2d 498 (6th Cir. 1982), modified, 102 F.T.C. 1147 (1983).
89. Xerox Corp., 86 F.T.C. 364, 369 (1975), modified, 91 F.T.C. 728, and modified, 100
F.T.C. 455 (1982), and modified, 102 F.T.C. 1107 (1983).
90. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 97 F.T.C. 443 (1981) (consent decree).
91. Gen. Motors Corp., 99 F.T.C. 464, 464-68 (1982) (describing the FTC’s 1976 com-
plaint).
92. Reuben H. Donnelley Corp., 95 F.T.C. 1, 1-5 (1980) (describing the FTC’s 1976 com-
plaint), enforcement denied sub nom. Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. FTC, 630 F.2d 920 (2d Cir.
1980).
93. See George A. Hay, Oligopoly, Shared Monopoly, and Antitrust Law, 67 CORNELL L.
REV. 439, 472 n.125 (1982).
94. Kellogg Co., 99 F.T.C. 8, 8-16 (1982) (describing the FTC’s 1972 complaint).
95. Exxon Corp., 98 F.T.C. 453, 454-59 (1981) (describing the FTC’s 1973 complaint).
96. Hertz Corp., 88 F.T.C. 715, 715-18 (1976) (describing the FTC’s 1975 complaint).
97. See George J. Benston, The Validity of Profits-Structure Studies with Particular
Reference to the FTC's Line of Business Data, 75 AM. ECON. REV., March 1985, 37, 39.
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connections between economic concentration, profitability, and oth-
er measures of economic performance.98 Industry strongly contested
the line-of-business program and litigation ensued.99 After several
years of litigation, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
sustained the FTC’s program.100
2. Horizontal Conduct
The FTC initiated several distinctive matters concerning agree-
ments involving competitors or having significant horizontal effects.
Most notably, the FTC challenged the American Medical Associa-
tion, the largest U.S. professional physicians association, for its ad-
vertising restrictions.101 The FTC also prosecuted a shopping mall
development (Tysons Corner) for agreeing with its anchor tenant
not to allow competing enterprises to locate stores in the develop-
ment.102
The FTC also brought a pathbreaking matter involving the
adoption of facilitating practices by rivals: the FTC challenged the
leading U.S. softwood plywood producers (Boise Cascade, Georgia
Pacific, and Weyerhaeuser) for the parallel, noncollusive adoption
of base-point pricing.103
3. Distribution Practices
The FTC acted upon the ABA report’s recommendations by
expanding its program to address vertical contractual restraints. A
flagship for this initiative was the prosecution of the leading U.S.
soft drink companies (Coca-Cola, Pepsi, Seven-Up, and Crush) for
giving their bottlers exclusive territories.104 The challenged behavior
98. See id. at 37-39.
99. See Appeal of FTC Line of Bus. Report Litig., 595 F.2d 685, 690 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
100. See id. at 711.
101. Am. Med. Ass’n, 94 F.T.C. 701, 701-03 (1979) (describing the FTC’s 1975 complaint),
amended by 99 F.T.C. 440 (1982), and amended by 100 F.T.C. 572 (1982), and amended by 114
F.T.C. 575 (1991).
102. Tysons Corner Reg’l Shopping Ctr., 85 F.T.C. 970, 971-72 (1975) (describing the FTC’s
1972 complaint), modified, 86 F.T.C. 921.
103. Boise Cascade Corp., 91 F.T.C. 1, 1-6 (1978) (describing the FTC’s 1974 complaint),
enforcement denied, 637 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1980).
104. Coca-Cola Co., 91 F.T.C. 517, 518-23 (1978) (describing the FTC’s 1971 complaint),
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had been a standard distribution practice in the sector for
decades.105 The FTC also brought a comparable matter against a
leading participant in the brewing sector (Coors).106 The FTC
demonstrated its commitment to police resale price maintenance
(RPM) more aggressively by challenging a minimum RPM agree-
ment imposed by the leading U.S. blue jeans manufacturer (Levi
Strauss).107
The FTC also investigated major U.S. aerospace companies
(Boeing, Lockheed, and McDonnell Douglas) that had used commer-
cial bribery to accomplish sales overseas.108 The investigation
yielded a consent decree in 1978.109
4. Notable Qualitative Features
This incomplete list is notable for several reasons beyond an
accounting of the number and types of cases. A number of cases
(Official Airline Guides,110 Kellogg Co.,111 Exxon Corp.,112 Boise
Cascade Corp.,113 and Xerox Corp.114) were premised substantially
or wholly upon the capacity of Section 5 of the FTC Act to reach
beyond existing interpretations of the other antitrust laws. FTC
complaints involving dominant firm misconduct or collective
dominance stated a theory of harm—the maintenance of a noncom-
petitive market power—that had no counterpart in existing
jurisprudence under the Sherman Act.115 All of these matters could
dismissed, 97 F.T.C. 257 (1981).
105. See id. at 623, 640.
106. Adolph Coors Co., 83 F.T.C. 32, 32-37 (1973) (describing the FTC’s 1971 complaint),
enforced in part, set aside in part, 497 F.2d 1178 (10th Cir. 1974).
107. Levi Strauss & Co., 92 F.T.C. 171, 171-75 (1978) (describing the FTC’s 1976
complaint), modified, 118 F.T.C. 1218 (1994).
108. See Boeing Co., 92 F.T.C. 972 (1978).
109. See id. at 973-75.
110. See Reuben H. Donnelley Corp., 95 F.T.C. 1, 6, 35 (1980), enforcement denied sub nom.
Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. FTC, 630 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1980).
111. 99 F.T.C. 8, 15 (1982).
112. 98 F.T.C. 453, 459 (1981).
113. 91 F.T.C. 1, 6 (1978), enforcement denied, 637 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1980).
114. 86 F.T.C. 364, 368 (1975), modified, 91 F.T.C. 728, and modified, 100 F.T.C. 455
(1982), and modified, 102 F.T.C. 1107 (1983).
115. See, e.g., Exxon Corp., 98 F.T.C. at 459 (noting the FTC had accused the petroleum
refiners of “restrain[ing] trade and maintain[ing] a noncompetitive market structure ... in
violation of Section 5 of the [FTC] Act”).
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be considered to be experimental, prototype cases that sought to
extend the reach of competition law.116
Another important aspect of the FTC’s program in this period was
the agency’s emphasis on structural remedies as a means to reduce
economic concentration. Four cases (Kellogg, Exxon, Borden, and
Xerox) sought structural relief in the form of divestitures or
compulsory trademark licensing, or both. In the cereal case, the
FTC sought to break each of the respondents into multiple firms,
and to mandate extensive royalty-free licensing of their trade-
marks.117 The relief requested in the petroleum shared monopoly
case comprised a mix of horizontal and vertical divestitures.118
Compulsory licensing of intellectual property anchored the request
for relief in the Borden119 and Xerox120 cases.
Finally, it is impressive to note the economic significance of the
commercial interests that the FTC prosecuted in its competition
program. The list of defendants is a roster of some of the most
significant firms in the U.S. economy of the 1970s: petroleum
(Exxon, Mobil, Chevron, Amoco, Gulf, Atlantic Richfield, Shell,
Texaco);121 food (Borden, Coca-Cola, Pepsi-Cola, Crush, Seven-Up,
IT&T, General Foods, Kellogg, General Mills, Sunkist);122 the
medical profession (American Medical Association);123 apparel (Levi
Strauss);124 lumber products (Boise Cascade, Weyerhaeuser);125
automobile manufacturing (General Motors);126 aerospace (Boeing,
Lockheed, and McDonnell Douglas);127 photocopiers (Xerox);128 and
transportation services (Hertz, Avis, and National).129 The agency’s
116. Cf. supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
117. See Kellogg Co., 99 F.T.C. 8, 33 (1982).
118. See Exxon Corp., 98 F.T.C. 457.
119. See Borden, Inc., 92 F.T.C. 669, 774-75 (1978), aff ’d, 674 F.2d 498 (6th Cir. 1982),
modified, 102 F.T.C. 1147 (1983).
120. See Xerox Corp., 86 F.T.C. 364, 379-80 (1975), modified, 91 F.T.C. 728, and modified,
100 F.T.C. 455 (1982), and modified, 102 F.T.C. 1107 (1983).
121. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 86-88, 90, 94, 98 and accompanying text.
123. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
124. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
125. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
126. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
128. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
129. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
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nonlitigation programs during this period also attracted the
attention of major business enterprises.130 As discussed earlier, the
line-of-business program affected many leading U.S. companies,
which vigorously attacked the FTC for this data collection
initiative.131
C. The Consumer Protection Agenda
As noted above, this Article deals mainly with the FTC’s 1970s
competition policy programs. To understand the magnitude of the
FTC’s redirection in this decade, it is important to note the extent
of the agency’s efforts to transform its consumer protection program
in this period leading up to the Pertschuk chairmanship. Several
highlights stand out. In the early 1970s, the FTC established its
advertising substantiation program, which required firms to support
factual claims made in advertising.132 Established through litigation
and policy guidance,133 the advertising substantiation program
transformed commercial advertising regulation in the United
States.134 It is the essential foundation of federal advertising
regulation today.135
Perhaps more notable was the FTC’s expanded recourse to
rulemaking to achieve consumer protection and, sometimes, com-
petition policy aims. This approach accelerated in the mid-1970s
when Congress adopted the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, which
expanded the FTC’s rulemaking authority.136 The list in Table 1
130. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
132. See Federal Trade Commission, Special Reports Relating to Advertising Claims, 36
Fed. Reg. 12058 (June 24, 1971).
133. The formative litigation matter was the FTC’s sunburn cream case against Pfizer.
Pfizer Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23 (1972). The agency subsequently issued guidelines that formalized
and extended the substantiation requirement. See Thompson Med. Co., 104 F.T.C. 648, 839-42
(1984), aff ’d, 791 F.2d 189 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
134. See Raymond D. Sauer & Keith B. Leffler, Did the Federal Trade Commission’s
Advertising Substantiation Program Promote More Credible Advertising?, 80 AM. ECON. REV.,
March 1990, at 191, 191-92 (finding that the increase in regulatory activity improved the
credibility of advertising).
135. See Randall Shaheen & Amy Ralph Mudge, Has the FTC Changed the Game on
Advertising Substantiation?, ANTITRUST, Fall 2010, at 65, 65 (noting the FTC’s efforts to
expand the advertising substantiation rule).
136. Magnuson-Moss Warranty—Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act § 202, 15
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below is a partial list of the FTC rulemaking matters completed
between 1969 and 1976:
Table 1: Selected FTC Rules Completed Between 1969 and
1977137
Rule Initial Proposal Year Issued
Octane Labeling138 1969 1971
Care Labeling139 1969 1971
Negative Option Plan140 1970 1973
Door-to-Door Sales Cooling Off Pe-
riod141
1970 1972
Holder in Due Course142 1971 1975
Mail Order Merchandise143 1971 1975
Table 2 provides a partial list of rulemaking proceedings pending at
the time Michael Pertschuk’s chairmanship began in 1977:
U.S.C. § 57a (2012).
137. For a complete list of major rulemakings during the 1970s, see William MacLeod et
al., Three Rules and a Constitution: Consumer Protection Finds its Limits in Competition
Policy, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 943, 953 & n.57 (2005). Table 1 above includes all of the major rules
from MacLeod’s list that were issued between 1969 and 1977.
138. Posting of Minimum Octane Numbers on Gasoline Dispensing Pumps, 36 Fed. Reg.
23,871 (Dec. 16, 1971) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 422).
139. Care Labeling of Textile Wearing Apparel, 36 Fed. Reg. 23,883 (Dec. 16, 1971) (to be
codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 423).
140. Use of Negative Option Plans by Sellers in Commerce, 38 Fed. Reg. 4896 (Feb. 22,
1973) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 425).
141. Cooling-Off Period for Door-to-Door Sales, 37 Fed. Reg. 22,934 (Oct. 26, 1972) (to be
codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 429).
142. Preservation of Consumers’ Claims and Defenses, 40 Fed. Reg. 53,506 (Nov. 18, 1975)
(to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 433).
143. Mail Order Merchandise, 40 Fed. Reg. 49,492 (Oct. 22, 1975) (to be codified at 16
C.F.R. pt. 435).
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Table 2: Proposed FTC Rules Pending in 1977144
Rule Initial Proposal
Vocational Schools145 1974
Credit Practices146 1975
Mobile Homes147 1975
Food Advertising148 1975
Hearing Aids149 1975
Prescription Drugs150 1975
Cellular Plastics151 1975
Health Spas152 1975
Protein Supplements153 1975
Funeral Services154 1975
144. For a complete list of major rulemakings during the 1970s, see MacLeod et al., supra
note 137, at 953-54, 953 n.57. Table 2 above includes all of the major rules from MacLeod’s
list that were proposed before 1977 but not issued by that year.
145. Advertising, Disclosure, Cooling Off and Refund Requirements Concerning
Proprietary Vocational and Home Study Schools, 39 Fed. Reg. 29,385 (proposed Aug. 15, 1974)
(to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 438).
146. Credit Practices, 40 Fed. Reg. 16,347 (proposed Apr. 11, 1975) (to be codified at 16
C.F.R. pt. 444).
147. Mobile Home Sales and Service, 40 Fed. Reg. 23,334 (proposed May 29, 1975) (to be
codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 441).
148. Food Advertising, 40 Fed. Reg. 23,086 (proposed May 28, 1975) (to be codified at 16
C.F.R. pt. 437).
149. Hearing Aid Industry, 40 Fed. Reg. 26,646 (proposed June 24, 1975) (to be codified at
16 C.F.R. pt. 440).
150. Disclosure Regulations Concerning Retail Prices for Prescription Drugs, 40 Fed. Reg.
24,031 (proposed June 4, 1975) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 447).
151. Cellular Plastics Products, 40 Fed. Reg. 30,842 (proposed July 23, 1975) (to be codified
at 16 C.F.R. pt. 439).
152. MacLeod et al., supra note 137, at 954. The Health Spas rule was not published in the
Federal Register. See id. at 953 n.57.
153. Advertising and Labeling of Protein Supplements, 40 Fed. Reg. 41,144 (proposed Sept.
5, 1975) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 454).
154. Funeral Industry Practices, 40 Fed. Reg. 39,901 (proposed Aug. 29, 1975) (to be
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Over-the-Counter Drugs155 1975
Holder in Due Course Rule Amend-
ment156
1975
Care Labeling157 1976
Opthalmic Practices158 1976
Antacid Advertising159 1976
Used Cars160 1976
The pending rules presented above implicated a broad swath of
U.S. commerce. Some of the affected firms were large enterprises
that operated throughout the United States.161 Others were small
businesses which, collectively, had a presence in many communities
across the country.162
D. The Administrative and Human Resources Infrastructure
From 1969 to 1976, the FTC responded to the ABA and Nader re-
ports by upgrading its processes for policy planning, setting prior-
ities, and selecting projects.163 The Commission undertook major
codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 453).
155. Advertising for Over-the-Counter Drugs, 40 Fed. Reg. 52,631 (Nov. 11, 1975) (to be
codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 450).
156. Preservation of Consumers’ Claims and Defenses, 40 Fed. Reg. 53,530 (proposed Nov.
18, 1975) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 433).
157. Care Labeling of Textile Products and Leather Wearing Apparel, 41 Fed. Reg. 3747
(proposed Jan. 26, 1976) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 423).
158. Advertising of Ophthalmic Goods and Services, 41 Fed. Reg. 2399 (proposed Jan. 16,
1976) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 456).
159. Advertising for Over-the-Counter Antacids, 41 Fed. Reg. 14,534 (proposed Apr. 6,
1976) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 451).
160. Sale of Used Motor Vehicles, 41 Fed. Reg. 1089 (proposed Jan. 6, 1976) (to be codified
at 16 C.F.R. 455).
161. See, e.g., Credit Practices, 40 Fed. Reg. 16,347, 16,347 (proposed Apr. 11, 1975) (to be
codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 444) (applying to “person[s] who engage[ ] in ... lending money to
consumers”).
162. See, e.g., Funeral Industry Practices, 40 Fed. Reg. 39,901, 39,901 (proposed Aug. 29,
1975) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 453) (applying to funeral homes).
163. See Kovacic, supra note 78, at 643-45.
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efforts to improve its human capital in management and case-
handling positions.164
II. TWO SPEECHES
Michael Pertschuk became the FTC’s Chairman in April 1977.165
Appointed by President Jimmy Carter, Pertschuk served on the
Commission from 1977 to 1984,166 and chaired the agency from 1977
to 1981.167 In the 1960s and 1970s, as one of the most powerful
staffers in the U.S. Congress, Pertschuk played a pivotal role in
drafting new consumer protection legislation.168 He had a sure grasp
of the FTC’s work in consumer protection, so he devoted consider-
able time early in his chairmanship to studying the FTC’s competi-
tion mission.169 Pertschuk spent several months with his staff and
external experts assessing the state of the agency’s antitrust
programs.170
After months in which he said little about his intentions for
antitrust, Pertschuk rolled out his program in two speeches late in
1977. He presented the first in Boston on November 18 before what
was then one of the most prominent gatherings of competition law
specialists, the New England Antitrust Conference.171 He gave the
second speech in Atlanta in December at the annual meeting of the
Association of American Law Schools.172 Together, the two talks
staked out a decidedly ambitious program for the agency.
164. See id. at 649-51.
165. See William E. Kovacic, The Quality of Appointments and the Capability of the Federal
Trade Commission, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 915 app.A at 953 (1997).
166. See id. app.B at 955.
167. See id. at 922.
168. See PERTSCHUK, supra note 11, at 35-154 (recounting the enactment of consumer
protection laws during Pertschuk’s tenure as a member of the Senate Commerce Committee
staff).
169. See Pertschuk, supra note 12, at 1.
170. See id.
171. Id.
172. Pertschuk, supra note 20.
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A. Boston: “Competition Policy in Its Broadest Sense”
Pertschuk titled his address before the New England Antitrust
Conference “New Directions for the FTC.”173 He called the talk “a
first public effort to set forth my own evolving competition philoso-
phy.”174 Pertschuk’s assessment of the state of U.S. antitrust policy
was generally gloomy. “I have seen and learned a good deal since
joining the Commission,” he began, “I have become increasingly
convinced that current antitrust policies lack clarity and convic-
tion.”175 Describing antitrust enforcement as one instrument of a
broader domain of “competition policy,”176 Pertschuk found its mod-
ern application to be seriously deficient:
[T]here is a widespread perception that antitrust has failed to
deal significantly with significant problems. In the clear, cold
light, there appears [to be] a failure of philosophy, a failure of
resources, and, most important, a failure of political courage, of
will. There is a sense abroad that federal antitrust cases have
not focused with enough frequency or intensity on the most
important questions.177
Even when the federal agencies had addressed “central questions”
such as “cases which would restructure dominant firms or entire
industries,” the efforts often yielded “protracted proceedings and
ineffective remedies instead of real reform.”178
Several failings in agency perspective and practice accounted for
the inadequate performance. The most basic failing was a cramped
view of their responsibilities:
The antitrust enforcement agencies have often been lacking in
historical perspective and imagination. Tending to think only
like litigators or to restrict themselves to a narrow allocative
efficiency approach to economics, they have failed to provide
leadership in their most important and fundamental area of
173. See Pertschuk, supra note 12, at 1.
174. See id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 2.
177. Id. at 3.
178. Id.
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responsibility: taking the broad view and attempting through
enforcement initiatives and the power of information to bring
the structure and behavior of major industries and, indeed, of
the economy itself more into line with the nation’s democratic
political and social ideals.179
In antitrust enforcement and other applications of their competition
law mandate, the federal agencies had lost sight of why Congress
created them: “Competition policy has inadequately served the
American people because it has forgotten that human beings are its
constituency.”180 The agencies too often “have lost touch with too
many aspects of the human condition[, leaving] [t]he individual ...
to dog-paddle as best he can in a rough sea of over-sized and often
undemocratic organizations—big government, big business, big
labor.”181
In his inadequacy narrative, Pertschuk chiefly villainized the U.S.
antitrust system’s growing emphasis on economic analysis, espe-
cially ideas generated by the Chicago School:
The heart of the present dilemma is a misunderstanding of the
social and political underpinnings of competition policy in the
United States, most vividly demonstrated by the role economic
analysis is accorded in policy decision-making and enforcement
activity today. Antitrust has been preoccupied with, if not
entirely overtaken by, the narrow economic objective of alloca-
tive efficiency. The impact of the Chicago School has certainly
been felt in the law schools, at the Commission, and in the
Courts.182
To Pertschuk, this direction of travel was ill conceived: “[C]ompeti-
tion policy, as I picture it, incorporates far more than the scientific
search for efficiency.”183
179. Id. at 4.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 5.
183. Id.
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1. The Cures
Pertschuk called for a competition policy rethink, starting with a
reformulation of its aims. He saw “a critical need to re-examine the
purposes of competition policy and to arrive at a new consensus as
to what [the FTC is] about.”184 He expected this reexamination to
produce an expanded vision of competition policy: “I believe we have
a mandate to develop competition policy in its broadest sense.”185 As
he explained, “broadest sense” encompassed a wide array of con-
cerns:
[A]lthough efficiency considerations are important, they alone
should not dictate competition policy. Competition policy must
sometimes choose between greater efficiency, which may carry
with it the promise of lower prices, and other social objectives,
such as the dispersal of power, which may result in marginally
higher prices. In 1977, no responsive competition policy can
neglect the social and environmental harms produced as
unwelcome by-products of the marketplace: resource depletion,
energy waste, environmental contamination, worker alienation,
the psychological and social consequences of marketing-stimu-
lated demands. Economic analysis can clarify the terms of the
trade-off between efficiency and other objectives to ensure that
the least inefficient remedy consistent with other policy objec-
tives is found. But economic analysis alone cannot dictate the
final outcome.186
In other passages, Pertschuk elaborated his vision of what con-
stituted competition policy “in its broadest sense.” He said “com-
petition policy can help assure that the worker has a choice of
employers to deal with and a work place of human scale.”187 He
warned that “[i]ncreasing macroconcentration can turn this coun-
try into a series of very big and very frightening company towns.”188
Instead, the country’s “economic structure should be consistent
184. Id.
185. Id. at 20.
186. Id. at 10 (emphasis added).
187. Id. at 8.
188. Id.
1296 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:1269
with the democratic political and social norms of the nation.”189
Moreover, the country’s economic structure “must operate within a
framework of fairness and ethical commercial conduct”190—an
objective embodied in the FTC’s mandate to arrest “unfair methods
of competition,” which Pertschuk said “clearly subsumes concepts
of both equity and efficiency.”191
To implement competition policy “in its broadest sense,”192 Pert-
schuk enumerated a number of specific steps he expected the FTC
to consider and, in many instances, to carry out. One element would
be forward-looking applications of Section 5 of the FTC Act to
address “the future structure, conduct and performance of in-
dustry.”193 The application of Section 5 “require[d] boldness on the
part of the decision-makers” and “bold action based upon reasoned
prediction.”194 Pertschuk noted that this dimension of the FTC’s
mandate “ha[d] been largely dormant since 1914,” but its revival
would be “central to the implementation of an effective competition
policy in the last quarter of this century.”195 He added that the FTC
was “contemplating a number of test cases [it] would like to bring,
when the appropriate facts are presented, to resolve the breadth of
Section 5 so that Congress will have a clearer picture of the scope of
existing competition legislation and the possible need for statutory
revisions.”196
Pertschuk highlighted other possibilities beyond a renewed
application of Section 5, such as fulfilling a promise, delivered
during his Senate confirmation hearings, to have the FTC conduct
“a large scale investigation of the impact of macroconcentration on
our lives.”197 He explained: “I want to stress that the realm of
competition policy includes problems of macroconcentration as well
as microconcentration. This would seem to be a truism, but because
of the blinders that antitrust has been wearing, it may lead to new
189. Id. at 6.
190. Id. at 9.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 20.
193. Id. at 11.
194. Id. at 12.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 15.
197. Id. at 16.
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directions for the Commission.”198 Pertschuk also anticipated “a
step-up in merger activities” and efforts “to refine the concept of
actual potential competition and to try to win its acceptance either
through the courts or, if necessary, by legislation.”199 Pertschuk also
said he expected the FTC to explore the use of rulemaking to make
competition policy, to expand the agency’s advocacy program
involving regulated industries and government curbs on competi-
tion, to focus more intensely on the design of effective remedies, and
to make fuller use of the FTC’s information-gathering and reporting
parties.200
Pertschuk closed his address by praising his immediate predeces-
sor, Calvin Collier, whom he thanked for “[h]is efforts at moderniz-
ing the management of the Commission and his constant, probing
demand for quality.”201 One might question the depth of Pertschuk’s
gratitude to Collier and other agency leaders who had shaped the
FTC’s program following the FTC’s near-death experience in 1969.202
The testimonial to Collier appeared on the final page of the speech’s
twenty-page text.203 Many of the previous nineteen pages had
documented the failures of federal antitrust policy.204 Among other
criticisms, Pertschuk recited a lack of boldness, a failure of political
will, a lack of vision, blindness to the true aims of competition
policy, and the incapacity to grasp the full potential inherent in the
FTC’s mandate205—not exactly a glowing tribute to Collier. In
Boston, Pertschuk positioned himself to change all of those failings,
and place the FTC on a fundamentally different path.206
198. Id. 
199. Id. at 16-17.
200. See id. at 17-19.
201. Id. at 20.
202. See Kovacic, supra note 78, at 599. (“If Congress, the President, and the agency’s own
leaders did not pursue a comprehensive reform program, the Committee flatly favored the
FTC’s abolition.”).
203. See Pertschuk, supra note 12 at 20.
204. See, e.g., id. at 1, 3-5 (criticizing current antitrust policy).
205. See id.
206. See id. at 20.
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B. Atlanta: “The Unchartered Territory of Competition Law”
In late December, Pertschuk came to the annual meeting of the
Association of American Law Schools (AALS), and spoke at a session
arranged by the organization’s Section on Antitrust and Economic
Regulation.207 He started with a rueful jibe at the symbiotic rela-
tionship that linked the FTC to a parasite economy of external
groups that profited from its presence:
[T]he FTC has brought Christmas cheer to many a prosperous
household: the Chevy Chase homes of the FTC bar, who enjoy
secure and gainful employment through generations of trial; the
deregulators, that hardy group which simultaneously reviles and
praises the FTC; the newsletter writers who proliferate and
prosper; woodsmen and papermakers, court reporters, printers,
and archivists.208
He promised that under his leadership the FTC would strive to
ensure “that the consumer and the citizen benefitted at least equally
as richly” from the FTC’s labors as its external constituencies.209 In
doing so, the agency would be “somewhat more bold, innovative and
risk-taking.”210 There was no mistaking the intended direction of the
agency’s competition programs: “[W]e are determined to venture in
the unchartered territory of the law of competition.”211
Pertschuk then summarized “the working principles of competi-
tion policy” he had set out a month earlier in Boston.212 He largely
paraphrased his “working principles of competition policy” from the
earlier text,213 but he also sharpened some of his previous remarks.
For example, he warned that “[a] failure of competition policy to
come to terms with the effects of very large institutions on the
quality of life can have repercussions that are far more threatening
to our society than some marginal losses of efficiency.”214
207. See Pertschuk, supra note 20.
208. Id. at 1.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 16.
212. Id. at 1.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 3.
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With this preamble in hand, Pertschuk turned to the chief
purpose of his talk to the law professors: to discuss how an ex-
panded application of Section 5 would enable the FTC to fulfill the
destiny he had described in Boston—“to develop competition policy
in its broadest sense.”215 Pertschuk said, “[W]e are convinced that
the FTC Act, interpreted unflinchingly and with imagination,
affords us the basic instrument for effectuating a far-reaching com-
petition policy.”216 He recited a traditional taxonomy of concepts that
courts had determined to be prohibited as “unfair method[s] of com-
petition.”217 He identified four categories: conduct that (1) trans-
gressed “the letter of either the Sherman Act or the Clayton Act[,]”
(2) “threatene[d] an incipient violation of” these antitrust statutes,
(3) “violate[d] the underlying spirit of” the other antitrust laws, or
(4) “violate[d] public policy” as articulated in statutes and other
legal commands outside the antitrust laws.218
Pertschuk’s framing of the FTC’s authority accurately reflected
and cited the legislative history and jurisprudence. This part of his
talk was unremarkable. The provocative element appeared in his
elaboration of what behavior the FTC might deem to be contrary to
public policy and worthy of condemnation under Section 5.219 He
correctly noted that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in FTC v.
Sperry & Hutchinson Co. (S&H)220 appeared to have given the FTC
considerable discretion to discern when conduct violated public
policy even though the behavior at issue violated neither the letter
nor the spirit of the antitrust laws.221 Pertschuk said the FTC would
continue to make use of the S&H precedent, “as it illustrates the
elastic nature of the concept of ‘unfairness’ which Section 5 embod-
ies.”222 In the following passage, Pertschuk discussed the potential
breadth of the power this elasticity gave the Commission:
215. See Pertschuk, supra note 12, at 20.
216. Pertschuk, supra note 20, at 5.
217. See id. at 7-10.
218. Id. at 8-10.
219. See id. at 10-12.
220. 405 U.S. 233, 239, 249-50 (1972).
221. See Pertschuk, supra note 20, at 11-12.
222. Id. at 12.
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What are the sources of public policy from which Section 5 can
draw? Certainly, we can include those policies declared by
statute .... We can also include policies established by the
generally recognized business ethics of the community .... The
implications are interesting, though I won’t dwell on them. Can
the FTC enjoin businessmen from employing illegal aliens?
Could we enjoin a company from cheating on its taxes to gain a
competitive advantage? Could we obtain an order requiring that
an environmentalist be placed on the board of a company that
repeatedly violates the pollution control laws? I leave you to
ponder these and related possibilities.223
In these comments, Pertschuk may have been thinking out loud in
an academic style before an audience of academics about one
dimension of competition policy rather than announcing well-
formulated intentions about the enforcement of Section 5.224
Perhaps Pertschuk meant only to speculate about the logical limits
of the public policy component of unfairness. Might Section 5 enable
the FTC to punish firms that gained a competitive advantage by
avoiding costs through their noncompliance with other legal com-
mands? Noncompliance could provide a major cost advantage; a
broad range of conduct that infringed legal rules outside the an-
titrust laws—for example, failing to satisfy air pollution abatement
mandates,225 ignoring workplace health and safety standards,226
223. Id. at 11.
224. See supra note 207 and accompanying text (noting the speech was delivered to the
AALS).
225. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) enforcement policy seeks to deter violations
of pollution control laws by recovering, in the calculation of civil penalties, the economic
benefit that violators derive from noncompliance. See, e.g., WASTE & CHEM. ENF ’T DIV., U.S.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, COMBINED ENFORCEMENT POLICY FOR CLEAN AIR ACT SECTIONS
112(R)(1), 112(R)(7), AND 40 C.F.R. PART 68, at 7-8 (2012) (discussing civil penalties for various
violations of the Clean Air Act and noting that “the [EPA] enforcement team should always
evaluate the economic benefit of noncompliance in calculating penalties”).
226. Studies of gruesome industrial accidents sometimes reveal that company management
deliberately violated health and safety laws. The coal dust explosion that killed twenty-nine
miners in April 2010 at Massey Energy Company’s Upper Big Branch Mine in West Virginia
is a notable example. NORMAN G. PAGE ET AL., MINE SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., REPORT OF
INVESTIGATION: FATAL UNDERGROUND MINE EXPLOSION, APRIL 5, 2010 (2011), https://arlweb.
msha.gov/Fatals/ 2010/UBB/FTL10c0331.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZYF8-F763]. The Mine Safety
and Health Administration’s report on the disaster found: “The physical conditions that led
to the explosion were the result of a series of basic safety violations at [the Upper Big Branch
mine] and were entirely preventable.” Id. at 2. The report added that Massey “promoted and
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employing illegal aliens and shortchanging their wages,227 or evad-
ing taxes228—could confer a significant cost advantage on their
wrongdoer. At a high conceptual level, do such illicitly attained cost
advantages not distort the competitive process?229 If so, are they not
unfair methods of competition?
Maybe Pertschuk’s aim was only to provoke an active discussion
among academics on a winter’s day in Atlanta. Yet, to pose the
questions as he did, even in the form of a “what if” hypothetical
before an audience fond of such thought exercises, had foreseeable
consequences beyond the AALS annual meeting. Pertschuk’s
remarks about the potential reach of Section 5 soon appeared in the
antitrust trade press.230 As Pertschuk’s opening comments indi-
cated, there is an attentive audience of external observers (such as
practitioners, business officials, journalists, advocacy groups) who
scour each word uttered by senior FTC officials for clues, genuine
and spurious, of intentions to be analyzed and reported.231
To the audience of FTC kremlinologists, Pertschuk’s comments
suggested, however faintly, that the FTC could become, and might
want to become, the nation’s omnibus regulator. An agency
enforced a workplace culture that valued production over safety, including practices
calculated to allow it to conduct mining operations in violation of the law.” Id.
227. See Kevin S. Marshall, The Unfair Trade Practice of Hiring Illegal Alien Workers, 11
U. PA. J. BUS. L. 49, 87-93 (2008) (finding that hiring illegal aliens at below-market wages
may constitute a violation of the federal antitrust laws and an unfair trade practice under
state law).
228. Some competition law systems directly seek to address competitive distortions that
can arise in the implementation of a taxation program. See, e.g., Commission Decision
2017/1283 of 30 August 2016 on State aid SA.38373 (23014/C) (ex 2014/CP) Implemented by
Ireland to Apple, 2017 O.J. (L187) 1 (EU) (applying state aid provisions of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union to compel Ireland to recover reductions in tax conferred
upon Apple). 
229. See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 227, at 87-93.
230. In early January 1978, BNA’s Antitrust & Trade Regulation Report carried an account
of the Pertschuk’s Atlanta speech and reported his comments about whether Section 5 of the
FTC Act might address the scenarios (hiring illegal aliens, nonpayment of taxes, and repeated
violations of environmental laws) Pertschuk had mentioned. See Pertschuk Speculates on
Stretching Laws: Can Robinson-Patman Act Apply to Services?, Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep.
(BNA), No. 845, at A-17 (Jan. 5, 1978). The legal press also covered Pertschuk’s Boston Speech
and summarized his plans for expanding the focus of antitrust law. See, e.g., Will Populist
Approach Work in Trustbusting? 64 A.B.A. J. 523, 523-24 (1978) (reviewing Pertschuk’s
Boston speech).
231. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
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determined to develop “competition policy in its broadest sense”232
and “venture in the uncharted territory of the law of competition”233
might aspire to use Section 5 to backstop the ineffective or half-
hearted efforts of other public bodies entrusted with primary
responsibility to enforce the law.234 If other regulatory agencies or
law enforcement bodies could not or would not do their jobs, Section
5 could provide a universal safety net.235 The application of Section
5’s public policy component would enable the FTC to secure com-
pliance with nonantitrust laws, subject only to the constraints
imposed by the agency’s budget ceiling.236 Were there any laws that
affected the operation of business enterprises that would not be fair
game for FTC intervention?
The brief rumination about the FTC as a super-regulator over-
shadowed specific proposals that were serious and not mere spec-
ulation. In one passage, Pertschuk said the FTC was considering
whether Section 5 could arrest “conglomerate mergers whose effects
tend to increase macrocentration, but which have no identifiable
anticompetitive effect in any one product and geographic mar-
ket[.]”237 He added that the agency was exploring the possibility of
devising a competition trade regulation rule to create a presumption
against conglomerate mergers of a certain size.238 In another com-
ment, Pertschuk said, “Section 5 may prove even more effective than
the Sherman Act in reaching actions by oligopolists who operate so
interdependently that the distinction between monopoly and ol-
igopoly is a chimera.”239 The Commission might consider whether
“certain acts of price signaling are incipient forms of collusion” and
whether Section 5 would allow the agency to challenge incipient
threats to competition posed by nondominant firms, without having
to demonstrate a “dangerous probability of success.”240
232. Pertschuk, supra note 12, at 20.
233. Pertschuk, supra note 20, at 16.
234. Cf. supra notes 219-23 and accompanying text.
235. Cf. supra notes 181, 193-96 and accompanying text.
236. Cf. supra notes 219-23 and accompanying text.
237. Pertschuk, supra note 20, at 14.
238. See id.
239. Id. at 14-15.
240. Id. at 15.
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III. THE PERTSCHUK PROGRAM
In a number of ways, the Pertschuk FTC sought to deliver on the
promise of the Boston speech and use Section 5 to stretch the fron-
tiers of enforcement. During Pertschuk’s chairmanship of the FTC,
the agency initiated the following competition litigation matters:
1. A Section 5 test case challenging the parallel, noncollusive
adoption of a facilitating practice in the tetraethyl lead industry
(Ethyl).241
2. A Section 5 test case challenging plant expansion announce-
ments as improper strategic entry deterrence (Du Pont/
Titanium Dioxide).242
3. A test case (Russell Stover) that sought to overturn the safe
harbor created in United States v. Colgate & Co.243 for firms that
announced a policy of not dealing with discounters and terminat-
ing retailers that did not abide by the policy.244
4. Cases that challenged potential competition mergers.245
5. Cases that reinforced the FTC’s authority to police restrictive
practices in the learned professions.246
Beyond these measures, the Commission studied litigation possibili-
ties that the agency ultimately did not pursue. It conducted pre-
liminary investigations of firms that might be suitable candidates
for a no-fault monopolization test case brought under Section 5 of
the FTC Act.247 In articles, speeches, and testimony, the Commission
241. Ethyl Corp., 101 F.T.C. 425 (1983), vacated sub nom. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co.
v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984).
242. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984).
243. 250 U.S. 300, 304-05 (1919).
244. See Russell Stover Candies, Inc. v. FTC, 718 F.2d 256, 257 (8th Cir. 1983).
245. See, e.g., BOC Int’l Ltd. v. FTC, 557 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1977).
246. See FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
247. I first joined the FTC in the fall of 1979 as an attorney in the Planning Office of the
Bureau of Competition. One of my assignments was to work with a team of Planning Office
attorneys to identify possible candidates for a no-fault test case that the FTC would bring
under Section 5. The team prepared one memorandum that spelled out the legal foundations
of a no-fault case and a second memorandum that singled out five companies as possible test
case targets. My recollection is that Campbell Soup Company stood atop the list of rec-
ommended targets. 
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supported antitrust legislative reforms to recognize a no-fault cause
of action.248
A key landmark of the Pertschuk era was the development of the
administrative and policy framework for implementing merger re-
view responsibilities imposed by the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust
Improvements Act of 1976 (HSR).249 Congress designed the HSR to
give the government an opportunity to review certain mergers
before they were consummated.250 The statute required firms un-
dertaking mergers above a certain size to notify the federal
antitrust agencies in advance.251 HSR established an initial waiting
period in which the agencies could decide whether to request ad-
ditional information from the merging parties; if the agencies
sought more information (a step known today as a “second request”),
the parties were obliged to provide it, and, upon completing the
submission, to give the reviewing agency additional time to consider
whether to challenge the transaction.252 During the initial waiting
period, the second request production, and the final waiting period,
the parties were barred from consummating the transaction.253
The HSR statute gave the FTC responsibility for administering
the merger notification regime on behalf of both federal antitrust
agencies254—a major administrative undertaking. The FTC drafted
the implementing rules and established the operational infrastruc-
ture—including a premerger notification office and the development
of internal procedures for reviewing information submitted by the
parties—to execute the system.255 Once the system went live late in
248. See Alfred F. Dougherty, Jr. et al., Elimination of the Conduct Requirement in
Government Monopolization Cases, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 83, 84-85 (1980).
249. See generally Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-
435, sec. 201, § 7A, 90 Stat. 1383, 1390-94 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2012)). For
information on the enactment and early implementation of the HSR premerger notification
system, see William E. Kovacic, HSR at 35: The Early U.S. Premerger Notification Experience
and Its Meaning for New Systems of Competition Law, in NEW COMPETITION
JURISDICTIONS—SHAPING POLICIES AND BUILDING INSTITUTIONS 9 (Richard Whish &
Christopher Townley eds., 2012).
250. See Malcolm R. Pfunder, Premerger Notification After One Year: An FTC Staff
Perspective, 48 ANTITRUST L.J. 1487, 1487-89 (1979).
251. See Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 § 7A(a).
252. See id. § 7A(d)-(e).
253. See id.
254. See id.; Kovacic, supra note 249, at 9-11.
255. See Pfunder, supra note 250, at 1487-89.
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1978, the FTC (and the DOJ) began the difficult task of deciding
what information to collect and, in challenging specific transactions,
when to engage with the federal courts to determine which stan-
dards should be applied in determining when challenged transac-
tions should be enjoined.256 None of these tasks—drafting rules,
devising procedures, and litigating the cases—was easy.
In his Boston speech, Pertschuk said the FTC would attempt to
use rulemaking to develop substantive competition policy stan-
dards.257 The FTC considered a variety of possibilities, but pro-
mulgated no competition policy rules other than the measures
required to implement the HSR statute.258 The Commission issued
an initial proposal to regulate standards and certification proces-
ses,259 and it gave consideration to measures to control certain
conglomerate transactions, to prohibit physician organizations from
controlling Blue Shield medical plans, and to bar integrated oil
companies from owning crude oil or petroleum products pipelines.260
The FTC ultimately adopted none of these measures.261 The agency’s
staff testified before Congress regarding legislation to amend the
Clayton Act to establish limits on conglomerate transactions and
recommended enactment of a “cap and spin-off” measure that would
allow large firms to make acquisitions so long as they divested an
equivalent amount of assets.262
256. See id.
257. See Pertschuk, supra note 12, at 19. At the time of Pertschuk’s arrival at the FTC, the
agency already had undertaken studies about the possibility of using rulemaking to achieve
its competition policy aims. See Burt Schorr, Regulatory Reach: FTC Plans to Promote
Competition by Use of Rules Now Limited to Consumer Area, WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 1977, at
38.
258. See Kovacic, supra note 78, at 664. For a list of promulgated HSR rules and their
proposed versions, see HSR Statements of Basis and Purpose, FED. TRADE COMMISSION,
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/premerger-notification-program/statute-rules-and-formal-
interpretations/statements-basis-purpose [https://perma.cc/KTM9-D62Q] (listing only five
final HSR rules promulgated during Pertschuk’s chairmanship, each of which was pro-
cedural).
259. Standards and Certification, 43 Fed. Reg. 57,269 (Fed. Trade Comm’n proposed Dec.
7, 1978) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 457).
260. See Kovacic, supra note 78, at 664.
261. See id.
262. The “cap and spin-off ” proposal and the testimony of FTC officials in support of
legislation to restrict conglomerate mergers are described in Michael Pertschuk & Kenneth
M. Davidson, What’s Wrong with Conglomerate Mergers?, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 5 & n.27, 17-
19 (1979).
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Under Pertschuk’s guidance, the FTC expanded its infrastructure
devoted to policy analysis, planning, and implementation. Among
other steps, the agency formed two new units in the Bureau of
Competition (the Office of Special Projects and the Planning Of-
fice),263 and created a consumer protection unit within the Bureau
of Economics.264 These and other FTC units undertook a wide range
of policy research and development projects to improve the founda-
tions for FTC policymaking. Key initiatives included:
1. Hearings and the publication of a report on the social effects
of firm size and market structure;265
2. Hearings and the publication of proceedings on the effects of
concentration in the media;266
3. A conference and published papers and proceedings on
modern theories of predation;267
4. Publication of staff papers setting out new theories of harm
involving raising rivals’ costs and facilitating practices;268
5. Publication of staff papers on the origins and meaning of the
FTC’s mandate and on the history of its enforcement
programs;269
6. A symposium and publication of proceedings on the history of
competition policy in the United States;270 and
263. See Kovacic, supra note 78, at 659.
264. See Paul A. Pautler, A History of the FTC’s Bureau of Economics 68-69, 128-29 (Am.
Antitrust Inst., Working Paper No. 15-03; Inst. for Consumer Antitrust Studies, Working
Paper No. 2015-3, 2015), https://www.antitrustinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/FTC-
Bureau-of-Economics-History_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z3BM-3GPM].
265. FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE ECONOMICS OF FIRM SIZE, MARKET STRUCTURE, AND SOCIAL
PERFORMANCE (John J. Siegfried ed., 1980).
266. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SYMPOSIUM ON MEDIA CONCENTRATION
(1978).
267. FED. TRADE COMM’N, STRATEGY, PREDATION, AND ANTITRUST ANALYSIS (Steven C.
Salop ed., 1981).
268. See, e.g., Donald S. Clark, Price-Fixing Without Collusion: An Antitrust Analysis of
Facilitating Practices After Ethyl Corp., 1983 WIS. L. REV. 887; Steven C. Salop & David T.
Scheffman, Raising Rivals’ Costs, 73 AM. ECON. REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE), May 1983, at 267.
269. For a list of such papers, see William E. Kovacic, The Importance of History to the
Design of Competition Policy Strategy: The Federal Trade Commission and Intellectual
Property, 30 SEATTLE UNIV. L. REV. 319, 333 n.78 (2007).
270. NATIONAL COMPETITION POLICY: HISTORIANS’ PERSPECTIVES ON ANTITRUST AND
GOVERNMENT-BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS IN THE UNITED STATES (Fed. Trade Comm’n ed., 1981).
The origin and purpose of these proceedings are described in William E. Kovacic, Antitrust
in Historical Context: Creating Historical Awareness for Competition Agencies, 60 ANTITRUST
BULL. 83 (2015).
2019] “COMPETITION POLICY IN ITS BROADEST SENSE” 1307
7. Evaluations of the economic effects of previous law enforce-
ment matters.271
As described more fully below, few of the agency’s innovative
litigation initiatives succeeded in the face of what proved to be
significant judicial resistance.272 Nor did the FTC’s legislative re-
forms become law.273 As the 1970s came to a close, the FTC’s
competition and consumer protection programs had created pow-
erful political backlash that threatened key elements of the FTC’s
authority.274
IV. A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT
Michael Pertschuk’s Boston and Atlanta speeches laid the
groundwork for a number of changes that fostered lasting improve-
ments at the FTC.275 The most notable enduring accomplishments
involved enhancements of institutional capacity: the initiation of
what became a continuing program of impact evaluations of com-
pleted matters,276 the creation of the HSR merger review system,277
the development of the agency’s role as a convenor of programs and
a sponsor of research involving emerging topics of law and policy,278
and the raising of awareness of history as a tool for improving
agency decision making.279
The Pertschuk litigation program also yielded some important
successes. A notable example is FTC v. Indiana Federation of
Dentists, which commanded sustained support from FTC leadership
into the 1980s and generated a favorable Supreme Court decision on
the application of the rule of reason.280 Most FTC cases initiated in
271. See generally William E. Kovacic, Using Ex Post Evaluations to Improve the
Performance of Competition Policy Authorities, 31 J. CORP. L. 503 (2006) (describing these
evaluations).
272. See infra Part IV.
273. See Kovacic, supra note 78, at 667.
274. See infra Part IV.B.
275. See supra Part II.
276. See supra note 271 and accompanying text.
277. See supra notes 249-56 and accompanying text.
278. See supra notes 263-71 and accompanying text.
279. See supra notes 269-71 and accompanying text.
280. 476 U.S. 447, 457-66 (1986).
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the 1970s by Pertschuk and his predecessors to extend the frontiers
of antitrust enforcement failed.281 The philosophy of expansionism
that guided FTC competition and consumer protection programs
from the late 1960s through the Pertschuk era—do more, push the
frontiers, be bold282—elicited a hostile reaction from Congress.283 A
legislative conflagration beset the agency from 1979 to 1982; with
a few relatively minor exceptions, the FTC successfully defended
most of its jurisdiction, but the near-death experience left lasting
scars.284
Why did the FTC enjoy relatively little success in building a
program of law enforcement and rulemaking grounded in an
understanding of “competition policy in its broadest sense”?285 Why
did so many of the agency’s proposed consumer protection rules run
aground? One popular narrative portrays the FTC of the 1970s, and
the Pertschuk era in particular, as simply a product of irrationality,
a period in which the FTC plunged into the abyss because it became
what one legislator called “a rogue agency gone insane.”286 This
narrative typically depicts Pertshuck as the villain and berates
him.287
For three reasons, the Pertschuk-centric irrationality narrative
is seriously mistaken. First, many failed projects that ultimately
inflicted woe on the FTC took shape before Pertschuk became the
FTC’s chairman.288 If the FTC came to grief because it abandoned
a necessary sense of caution or realism in applying its broad powers,
281. The Commission dismissed its shared monopolization cases against the breakfast
cereal manufacturers and the petroleum refiners. Kellogg Co., 99 F.T.C. 8, 269 (1982); Exxon
Corp., 98 F.T.C. 453, 459-62 (1981). Various courts of appeals denied enforcement of
Commission orders in three cases initiated in the 1970s and predicated upon the application
of Section 5 of the FTC to reach conduct not prohibited by the other antitrust laws. E.I. Du
Pont De Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128, 142 (2d Cir. 1984); Official Airline Guides, Inc.
v. FTC, 630 F.2d 920, 927-28 (2d Cir. 1980); Boise Cascade Corp. v. FTC, 637 F.2d 573, 582
(9th Cir. 1980). The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals also denied enforcement of the FTC’s
order in a test case that sought to overturn the Colgate doctrine. Russell Stover Candies, Inc.
v. FTC, 718 F.2d 256, 260 (8th Cir. 1983).
282. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
283. See PERTSCHUK, supra note 10, at 69-117; Kovacic, supra note 78, at 664-67.
284. See Kovacic, supra note 78, at 664-67; infra Part IV.B.
285. See Pertschuk, supra note 12, at 20.
286. See Kovacic, supra note 78, at 590 (quoting 125 CONG. REC. H10,758 (daily ed. Nov.
14, 1979) (statement of Rep. Frenzel)).
287. See, e.g., PERTSCHUK, supra note 11, at 69-70.
288. See supra Part I.A.
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Pertschuk’s predecessors (especially Caspar Weinberger, Miles
Kirkpatrick, and Lewis Engman289) deserve a generous share of
blame for the result.290 At most, Pertschuk added fuel to a conflagra-
tion ignited well before he became the agency’s chair; if Pertschuk
was irrational—for example, in seeking to press the exercise of the
FTC’s powers to the limits and aggressively attack problems of
industrial concentration—he had lots of respectable company.291
Second, portraying the FTC of the Pertschuk era (and the 1970s,
more generally) as an unrelieved calamity overlooks the many good
things that Pertschuk and the Commission did in this period. As
noted in the introduction to this Part, various FTC substantive
programs and processes established in the 1970s and during the
Pertschuk chairmanship have improved the quality of competition
and consumer protection policy.292 The paint-it-black interpretation
ignores valuable FTC accomplishments in the 1970s, and dimin-
ishes our understanding of how good programs and practices
originate.
Third, and most relevant to this Article, the irrationality nar-
rative that casts Pertschuk as the demented head of a “rogue agen-
cy gone insane”293 takes an easy way out of the problem of why
289. See Kovacic, supra note 165, at 953 app.A.
290. See generally supra Part I.B.
291. See generally supra Part III (describing the ambitious FTC competition and consumer
protection programs initiated earlier in the late 1960s and in the 1970s before Pertschuk’s
chairmanship began). Pertschuk’s predecessors used adventurist rhetoric hardly different
from his own. For example, in 1970, in a letter to Senator Edward Kennedy, Weinberger said
the Commission was urging its staff “to make recommendations to us that will probe the
frontiers of our statutes.” William E. Kovacic, Congress and the Federal Trade Commission,
57 Antitrust L.J. 869, 876 n.29 (1988) (quoting Letter from Caspar W. Weinberger, Chairman,
Fed. Trade Comm’n, to Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Chairman, Senate Subcomm. on Admin.
Practice & Procedure (July 22, 1970), in Hearing on the Nomination of Miles K. Kirkpatrick
to be Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, 91st
Cong. 133-34 (1970)). Weinberger added that the agency was making progress in “[p]robing
the outer limits” and “exploring the frontiers” of its statutes. Id. In remarks published in
1971, Kirkpatrick said he and his fellow commissioners “fully intend to be in the vanguard
of exploration of the new frontiers of antitrust law.” Id. at 876 (quoting Federal Trade
Commission, ’43 Grad Transforms Agency into a ‘Growling Watchdog’, U. PA. L. ALUMNI J.,
Fall 1971, at 9). Pertschuk’s commitment to deconcentration echoed the views of many
contemporary commentators, including distinguished academics who advocated the
application of “no-fault” monopolization theories to restructure dominant firms. See Kovacic,
supra note 58, at 1137.
292. See supra notes 275-80 and accompanying text.
293. See supra note 286 and accompanying text.
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regulatory agencies and other organizations fail. The irrationality
narrative excoriates a scapegoat (here, Pertschuk) for problems
substantially attributable to flaws in culture, design, and operations
of institutions.294 This blame-casting approach ignores major in-
stitutional factors that deserve more attention in explaining the
behavior of the FTC and other regulatory bodies. The popular ritual
of individual condemnation hides institutional weaknesses that
have contributed to policy failures at the FTC.295 
The discussion below considers the performance of the FTC in the
1970s and the Pertschuk era by identifying institutional weaknesses
that contributed to its mixed record of success in executing its
substantive programs and exposed the agency to destructive pol-
itical backlash in the late 1970s and early 1980s. As the discussion
indicates, Pertschuk made his own share of improvident decisions.
Yet the decision making lapses were not his alone. Some miscalcu-
lations—for example, the failure to achieve a suitable match be-
tween the agency’s commitments and its capabilities—were evident
in the choices made by Pertschuk’s predecessors.296 Deeper institu-
tional explanations account for a number of difficulties that
commentators tend to lay at Pertschuk’s feet. The aim here is to
illuminate avoidable errors rooted in how institutions make de-
cisions.
294. Simple explanations that attribute failure in complex organizations to the “human
error” of specific individuals often overlook larger institutional forces that cause such systems
to break down. See generally DIANE VAUGHN, THE CHALLENGER LAUNCH DECISION: RISKY
TECHNOLOGY, CULTURE, AND DEVIANCE AT NASA (1996) (examining how culture and decision
making processes of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration influenced decision
to launch the Challenger space shuttle on its fatal journey); DAVID D. WOODS ET AL., BEYOND
HUMAN ERROR (2d ed. 2010) (focusing on how “human error” can obscure system
malfunctions). On the phenomenon of scapegoating individuals as a convenient alternative
to addressing larger institutional deficiencies that cause organizations to fail, see Marilyn
Paul, Moving from Blame to Accountability, SYS. THINKER, https://thesystemsthinker.com/
moving-from-blame-to-accountability/ [https://perma.cc/R88T-NHTQ]. In regulatory policy,
the decisions of individual leaders can have a major impact on the outcomes produced by their
agencies, but these decisions must be considered in the larger context of institutional forces
that determine what regulators do. See PETER H. SCHUCK, WHY GOVERNMENT FAILS SO OFTEN
AND HOW IT CAN DO BETTER (2014).
295. See, e.g., Marc Winerman & William E. Kovacic, Outpost Years for a Start-Up Agency:
The FTC from 1921-1925, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 145 (2010) (attributing policy failures of the FTC
to inadequate attention to building capacity to handle difficult matters, rather than to the
unwillingness of Commission leadership to address major economic problems).
296. See supra notes 288-90 and accompanying text.
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A. Poor Historical Awareness
In his tenure as FTC Chairman, Pertschuk spoke perceptively
about using history to improve agency decisionmaking. His Boston
speech mentioned the contributions of historians as potentially
useful sources of insight to guide FTC policy.297 In 1979, the FTC
convened a series of seminars by leading business historians, who
examined the changing and often ambivalent role of competition
policy in the United States.298 In the late 1970s and early 1980s,
with Pertschuk’s encouragement, FTC staff members performed
extensive research projects, and published papers on the agency’s
formation and the history of its efforts to carry out its mandate.299
The man who deeply cared for history lacked an informative
historical perspective when he needed it the most—namely, in
formulating his program in 1977 and in rolling out his competition
and consumer initiatives in 1977-1978. As discussed in Part II.A.
above, Pertschuk’s Boston speech portrayed the FTC as a seriously
underperforming agency.300 Pertschuk depicted the FTC as timid
and unimaginative; the FTC wanted for political will, lacked a
proper understanding of its aims, and too often ducked significant
matters.301 The FTC of the Boston speech was beholden to an
excessively narrow economic (Chicago School) perspective; it shirked
its fuller responsibility to look beyond price effects to account for the
interests of workers, to accomplish goals originating in other legal
commands (for example, environmental policy), and to promote
market structures compatible with the nation’s democratic ideals.302
Because it lacked fortitude and an appreciation for “competition
policy in its broadest sense,”303 the FTC had not explored creative
297. Pertschuk, supra note 12, at 4.
298. See, e.g., supra note 207 and accompanying text.
299. Representative contributions include Neil W. Averitt, The Meaning of “Unfair Methods
of Competition” in Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 21 B.C. L. REV. 227 (1980);
Kovacic, supra note 78; Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary
Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65 (1982);
see also supra note 269 and accompanying text.
300. See Pertschuk, supra note 12, at 3-5; supra notes 175-83 and accompanying text.
301. See Pertschuk, supra note 12, at 3.
302. See id at 4-5; supra notes 179-83 and accompanying text.
303. See Pertschuk, supra note 12, at 20.
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ways to fulfill its destiny by using its distinctive mandate, Section
5, to proscribe unfair methods of competition.304
The Boston speech revealed a poor understanding of the FTC’s
history, both recent and more distant. Pertschuk showed no aware-
ness of the significance of the matters that the agency had un-
dertaken from 1969 through 1976, nor did he comprehend the
magnitude of the program the Commission had in flight in the late
fall of 1977.305 Pertschuk and his advisors seem to have not mapped
out the commitments, summarized in Part I above, that the FTC
was already seeking to fulfill.306 Pertschuk’s call for ambition and
boldness did not grasp the boldness and ambition of the agency’s
existing antitrust litigation portfolio.307 In what possible sense could
efforts to break up the leading petroleum refiners308 and the largest
breakfast cereal producers309 be deemed substantively unimagina-
tive, risk-avoiding, or lacking political courage? Or running three
304. Cf. supra notes 193-97 and accompanying text.
305. See generally supra Part I.B. Pertschuk’s claim that U.S. antitrust enforcement in the
years leading up to 1977 lacked courage and political will also took no apparent account of the
magnitude of the DOJ’s litigation program involving dominant firms. At the time of the
Pertschuk speeches in 1977, the DOJ was prosecuting monopolization cases against the
nation’s largest producer of mainframe computers (IBM), the country’s principal telephone
company (AT&T), and its two leading manufacturers of automobile tires. See United States
v. IBM Corp., [1961-1970 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 45,069 (S.D.N.Y. filed
Jan. 17, 1969) (complaint alleging monopolization and attempted monopolization); United
States v. AT&T Co., [1970-1979 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 45,074 (D.D.C.
filed Nov. 20, 1974) (complaint alleging monopolization, attempted monopolization, and
conspiracy to monopolize); United States v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., and United States
v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., [1970-1979 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 45,073
(N.D. Ohio filed Aug. 9, 1973).
306. See generally supra Part I.B (describing the FTC’s antitrust agenda before Pertschuk
became chairman). One basis for this observation is my experience at the FTC in the late
1970s and early 1980s. From late 1979 through 1982, I was an attorney in the Planning Office
of the Bureau of Competition. In preparing a history of the FTC’s competition programs and
its relations with Congress, see Kovacic, supra note 291, I devoted special attention to the
formulation of the FTC’s competition program from the late 1960s through the 1970s. I found
no indication that the agency (including the Pertschuk leadership team) realized in 1977 how
the agency’s agenda from 1969 through 1976 was easily the most ambitious competition
enforcement program in the FTC’s history and, arguably, no less remarkable in its scope and
aims than the DOJ antitrust program from 1905 to 1920. See Kovacic, supra note 78
(discussing DOJ deconcentration efforts in early 20th century). 
307. See generally supra Part I.B.
308. See Exxon Corp., 98 F.T.C. 453 (1981); supra note 95 and accompanying text.
309. See Kellogg Co., 99 F.T.C. 8 (1982); supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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predatory pricing cases at one time against major enterprises?310 Or
dismantling the distribution system relied upon by soft drink
producers for much of the twentieth century?311 Or attacking the
longstanding advertising codes of the nation’s largest medical pro-
fessional association?312
The Boston and Atlanta speeches were no less historically obtuse
in discussing the expanded application of Section 5 of the FTC
Act.313 In spelling out what he meant to do with Section 5, Pertschuk
made little mention of what the agency already was doing, and how
far it was reaching in prosecuting highly experimental theories of
infringement.314 The FTC had already concluded one expansive,
pathbreaking application of Section 5 in settling its monopolization
case against Xerox.315 In late 1977, the agency was running four
major matters—the Exxon and Kellogg shared monopolization
cases, the Boise Cascade facilitating practices case, and the Official
Airline Guides refusal to deal case—that were premised substan-
tially or entirely on Section 5.316 The Boston and Atlanta speeches
give no hint that Pertschuk or his staff—in the months of reflection
and preparation that led up to his presentations—understood the
doctrinal and economic stakes of these cases.317
The lack of short-term historical awareness in the Boston and
Atlanta speeches is bewildering and distressing. How could the new
chairman and his staff underestimate the significance (and dif-
ficulty) of the existing portfolio, and why did they not assess this
310. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
311. See supra Part I.B.3.
312. See Am. Med. Ass’n, 94 F.T.C. 701 (1979) amended by 99 F.T.C. 440 (1982), and
amended by 100 F.T.C. 572 (1982), and amended by 114 F.T.C. 575 (1991); supra note 101 and
accompanying text.
313. Cf. Pertschuk, supra note 12, at 11-12 (Boston speech); Pertschuk, supra note 20, at
8-10 (Atlanta Speech).
314. Cf. Pertschuk, supra note 12, at 11-12 (Boston speech); Pertschuk, supra note 20, at
8-10 (Atlanta Speech).
315. See Xerox Corp., 86 F.T.C. 364 (1975), modified, 91 F.T.C. 728 (1978), and modified,
100 F.T.C. 455 (1982), and modified, 102 F.T.C. 1107 (1983). On the significance of the Xerox
case, see Willard K. Tom, The 1975 Xerox Consent Decree: Ancient Artifacts and Current
Tensions, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 967 (2001).
316. See Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. F.T.C., 630 F.2d 920, 922-23 (2d Cir. 1980); Kellogg
Co., 99 F.T.C. 8 (1982); Exxon Corp., 98 F.T.C. 453 (1981); Boise Cascade Corp., 91 F.T.C. 1
(1978), enforcement denied, 637 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1980).
317. See generally Pertschuk, supra note 12 (Boston speech); Pertschuk, supra note 20
(Atlanta Speech).
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program in the context of the FTC’s history going back to 1914? I
offer two answers to this perplexing question. First, the prevailing
sentiment, inspired by the Nader and ABA studies in 1969,318 that
the FTC had to do greater things to justify its existence, caused
Pertschuk and his advisors to discount the significance of cases
already underway. The second explanation points to an institutional
weakness. There should have been a mechanism in the FTC to
assess current developments in their larger historical context. This
mechanism would have made Pertschuk and his advisors aware
that, from its first decade onward, the FTC’s efforts to undertake
bold and imaginative applications of its competition or consumer
protection powers confronted two, often-crippling obstacles: They
involved massive implementation challenges that put a premium on
recruiting and retaining capable staff, and they tended to arouse
congressional opposition and, in some instances, spurred Congress
to intervene destructively in the agency’s affairs.319 
One expects that a primer on the agency’s history—especially
about its occasionally tumultuous relations with Congress—would
have caught Pertschuk’s attention. In his Atlanta speech, Pertschuk
spoke approvingly of a 1940s FTC litigation program instituted to
challenge the adoption of basing point pricing systems as a violation
of Section 5.320 Pertschuk did not mention that the FTC’s litigation
success in this endeavor provoked a harsh congressional backlash.321
So intense was the opposition that Congress elicited promises from
the FTC never again to rely on features of the recent basing point
cases that endorsed the agency’s effort to dispense with a finding of
agreement in prosecuting such behavior under Section 5.322 In doing
so, Congress in effect forced the FTC to forswear the future ap-
plication of the doctrinal end it had sought to achieve with Section
5. The basing-point pricing episode provided a sobering lesson about
how political backlash can eviscerate an inventive, novel Section 5
case, and Pertschuk’s team missed it.
318. See supra Par I.A.
319. See Kovacic, supra note 291, at 874.
320. See Pertschuk, supra note 20, at 8-9.
321. See id.; see also William E. Kovacic & Marc Winerman, Competition Policy and the
Application of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 929, 933-34,
934 n.19, 943 (2010).
322. See Kovacic & Winerman, supra note 321, at 943 n.66.
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B. Lack of Political Awareness
In 1977, awareness of the larger historical context in which the
FTC’s programs had evolved would not have dictated the abandon-
ment of politically risky cases.323 Instead, a better sense of the
Commission’s history would have revealed a potential hazard of
using the agency’s distinctive authority to pursue a “competition
policy in its broadest sense.”324 Such awareness would have pressed
Pertschuk and his advisors to reflect more carefully on the political
feedback loop that had confronted the agency since 1914.325 FTC
cases involving high economic stakes—especially matters involving
the application of novel theories of liability, and the pursuit of
powerful remedies—tend to attract the attention of legislators
whose constituents are agency targets.326 This reality requires the
FTC to consider how many major battles it can fight at one time,
and to find ways to mobilize countervailing political support for the
contests it pursues.327
Thus, applying the agency’s broad policy making powers can have
strong side effects, which the agency ignores at its peril.328 Accu-
rately mapping the FTC’s competition and consumer protection
agendas as of the fall of 1977 would have revealed the full dimen-
sions of the political risks the agency had already undertaken.329
This exercise would also have indicated the possibilities of formulat-
ing powerful commercial coalitions that might assemble to demand
intervention from Congress and the executive branch.330 A missing
ingredient in the Commission’s decision making process in the
1970s was a conscious process to account for political risk—by
anticipating potential political hazards of proposed and ongoing
matters, and by devising counter measures.
323. See id.
324. Pertschuk, supra note 12, at 20.
325. See Kovacic, supra note 78, at 623.
326. See id. at 628 n.211.
327. See Daniel Jay Baum, Antitrust Functions of the Federal Trade Commission: Area
Discrimination and Product Differentiation, 24 FED. B.J. 579, 606 (1964).
328. See id.; Kovacic, supra note 78, at 627.
329. See Kovacic & Winerman, supra note 321, at 943.
330. Cf. id.
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Political awareness also requires ongoing monitoring of shifts in
the political environment that could affect the FTC’s fortunes.331
Pertschuk was an astute student of the legislative process,332 and
his remarks in Boston revealed his confidence that Congress would
support his plans for more aggressive competition and consumer
protection programs.333 Since the ABA and Nader reports, Congress
had supported the FTC’s transformation not only in demanding bold
applications of the agency’s authority but also in augmenting the
agency’s statutory powers and budget.334 The FTC enjoyed especially
strong backing in the Senate, where Pertschuk’s patron (Senator
Warren Magnuson) and a large cohort of Democrats and Republi-
cans had urged the agency to explore the frontiers of its powers.335
In the eyes of a number of powerful legislators in the first half of the
1970s, the FTC’s program was merely a good start.336
This supportive environment began to erode in the 1976 national
elections.337 Jimmy Carter’s victory for the presidency obscured
major changes in the Senate, where key members of the pro-FTC
coalition retired or failed to gain reelection.338 In many instances,
senators with greater skepticism about the regulatory process
replaced pro-FTC senators.339 A growing, vocal chorus of business
opponents to the Commission was forming, and a more sympathetic
Congress awaited the complaining commercial interests.340
Pertschuk’s 1977 speeches did not take note of the changing
political and commercial environment in which the Commission
would have to carry out programs that explored “the unchartered
territory of the law of competition.”341 The development of his
program through 1978 seemed oblivious to the political storm that
331. See Kovacic, supra note 291, at 871, 881-82, 886-87.
332. See id. at 887 n.67; Pertschuk, supra note 11.
333. Pertschuk, supra note 12, at 14.
334. Kovacic, supra note 78, at 632-36, 640-41, 652.
335. See id. at 632-41 (discussing examples of how the Senate encouraged the agency to use
its powers).
336. See id. at 632-34 (citing Senators who wanted the FTC to do more).
337. See id. at 659.
338. See Kovacic, supra note 291, at 882 n.48.
339. See id.
340. See The Escalating Struggle between the FTC and Business—Executives Openly
Challenge the Actions and Policies of the Newly Activist Agency, BUS. WK., Dec. 13, 1976, at
53 (describing the growing business opposition to the FTC).
341. Pertschuk, supra note 12 (Boston speech).
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had begun to descend on the FTC.342 Key events that spelled further
trouble for the FTC in 1978 included a Washington Post editorial
ridiculing the FTC for assuming the role of the “National Nanny” in
trying to adopt a rule that would limit the advertising of certain
foods to children,343 and a further conservative shift in the Senate
in the fall midterm elections.344
In barely two years, from the fall of 1976 to the fall of 1978, the
congressional mood toward the FTC had changed from supportive
to disturbingly hostile.345 Programs that began earlier in the decade
in a more agreeable setting now confronted increasingly formidable
opposition as they matured.346 By 1980, before Ronald Reagan came
to Washington, D.C. as President, the roof had fallen in on the FTC.
On two occasions the agency closed shop for a few days because
Congress allowed its funding to lapse.347 On the day before national
elections in November 1980, Vice President Walter Mondale
promised at a rally in Battle Creek, Michigan (headquarters of
Kellogg) that he and Jimmy Carter would seek legislation to bar the
FTC from imposing structural relief in the Kellogg’s cereal shared
monopoly case.348
C. Poor Awareness of Policy Implementation Prerequisites
Running successful cases requires an agency to have strong
human talent in substantive disciplines, such as law and economics;
in forensic skills, such as investigation and advocacy; and in
administrative teams that support the economists and lawyers.349
342. See Kovacic, supra note 291, at 887, 896.
343. PERTSCHUK, supra note 10, at 69-70 (quoting Editorial, The FTC as National Nanny,
WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 1978, at A22).
344. See Kovacic, supra note 291, at 882 n.48.
345. See supra notes 337-40 and accompanying text.
346. See Kovacic, supra 291, at 882 n.48.
347. See Kovacic, supra note 78, at 665; Deborah Platt Majoras, The Federal Trade
Commission: Learning from History As We Confront Today's Consumer Challenges, 75 UMKC
L. REV. 115, 118 (2006).
348. See William E. Kovacic, Creating a Respected Brand: How Regulatory Agencies Signal
Quality, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 237, 241 (2015).
349. See William E. Kovacic & David A. Hyman, Consume or Invest: What Do/Should
Agency Leaders Maximize?, 91 WASH. L. REV. 295, 299-301 (2016); see also AM. BAR ASS’N,
supra note 23, at 32-33 (discussing the need for high quality personnel at the FTC); Kovacic,
supra note 78, at 649 (discussing the FTC’s recruitment and retention efforts for attorneys
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The harder the cases, the better the talent must be.350 Cases that
involve large economic stakes or advance novel theories of liability
place greater demands on the agency’s teams than matters that
concern lesser economic importance and rest upon well-established
principles of law.351 Cases that implicate large economic stakes and
seek to extend the boundaries of doctrine are the hardest of the
lot.352
When an agency strikes at the heart of large economic interests,
the affected organizations assemble the best teams of lawyers and
economic consultants they can find to defend themselves success-
fully.353 For an agency to prevail in such matters, it must field a
team with comparable skills.354 Thus, a crucial question for an agen-
cy in deciding whether to launch a specific case is who will handle
the matter.355 In answering this question, that agency cannot make
the blithe assumption that its best team can handle all of its dif-
ficult matters.356 Agencies vary considerably in the breadth and
depth of their talent, but no agency has a limitless number of first-
rate case-handling teams.357 If an agency is to operate effectively, it
must strive to ensure that the commitments entailed by its initia-
tion of cases matches its capability to deliver.358 An agency’s com-
mitments can outrun its capability by some margin; this can be an
inevitable step in stretching and improving an agency’s skills.359 An
and economists).
350. See supra note 349 and accompanying text.
351. See Kovacic, supra note 78, at 628 n.211; William E. Kovacic, Deciding What To Do
and How To Do It: Prioritization, Project Selection, and Competition Agency Effectiveness, 13
COMPETITION L. REV. 9, 22 (2018).
352. See supra note 351 and accompanying text.
353. See Kovacic, supra note 78, at 628 n.211; Kovacic, supra note 351, at 22.
354. See Kovacic, supra note 351, at 22.
355. See id. at 22-23.
356. See id. at 22.
357. See id.
358. See id. at 21-24 (discussing the importance of sound project selection methods to
ensure that an agency’s commitments do not outrun its capability); see also ROBERT A.
KATZMANN, REGULATORY BUREAUCRACY—THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AND ANTITRUST
POLICY 202-03 (1980) (reviewing difficulties that FTC encountered in executing its ambitious
antitrust litigation agenda in the 1970s and observing “[p]erhaps, the commission should
consider placing its much improved decision-making apparatus at the service of activities
better suited to the organization’s institutional capacities”).
359. Cf. Kovacic, supra note 351, at 22-23.
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agency that tries to run at 200 percent of its capacity will break
down.360
As recounted above, the dramatic upgrade of the FTC’s programs
contemplated in the ABA and Nader reports—bigger defendants,
larger economic stakes, ambitious applications of doctrine—required
a sweeping overhaul of its personnel.361 The agency could only take
on a bolder agenda if it could recruit the managers and staff with
the skills to run those projects effectively.362 The demand for instant
results meant that the agency could not wait until every piece was
in place before it embarked on the new agenda.363 If the FTC rolled
out its program too quickly, however, it faced a genuine risk of being
crushed by the formidable opposition that its bold, economically
significant cases would arouse.364
By early 1977, the FTC had achieved a poor match between its
commitments and capabilities. For example, the showcase shared
monopoly cases365 were in trouble from the outset, as the defendants’
strong legal teams ensnared the agency in the litigation-equivalent
of trench-by-trench warfare.366 A careful look at the roster of com-
petition and consumer protection matters pending in early 1977, as
presented in Part I.B above, and reflection on the sophistication,
experience, and sheer size of the advisors retained by the affected
firms should have inspired the FTC to ask itself how it could land
360. See id. at 22.
361. See Kovacic, supra note 78, at 628 & n.211; supra Part I.A.1.
362. See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 23, at 32-33.
363. See Kovacic, supra note 78, at 630-31.
364. See Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 9, at 1969 (“The pursuit of economically significant
matters galvanizes tougher opposition in litigation and motivates firms to seek out legislative
assistance in backing down the agency.”); supra notes 351-52 and accompanying text.
365. See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
366. In my first two years at the FTC, from 1979 to 1981, I was assigned to assist the team
working on the Exxon shared monopolization case. I saw firsthand the mismatch between the
resources and talent that the FTC was able to devote to the case and the advisors arrayed
against it on behalf of the eight petroleum refiner defendants. See Kovacic & Hyman, supra
note 349, at 305. The same ferocity of opposition was apparent in the FTC’s high visibility
consumer protection matters, such as the rulemaking to restrict certain advertising toward
children. See Peter L. Strauss, Disqualifications of Decisional Officials in Rulemaking, 80
COLUM. L. REV. 990, 990-92 (1980) (describing an ultimately unsuccessful litigation campaign
by industry groups to disqualify Michael Pertschuk from participation in FTC’s children’s
advertising rulemaking); see also Stephanie Gould, Michael Pertschuk and the Federal Trade
Commission (Harvard Kennedy School Case Study No. 387.0; Jan. 1, 1981) (discussing
business opposition to proposed children’s advertising rule).
1320 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:1269
its pending matters successfully.367 Such an assessment might have
inspired still deeper thinking later in the year about how the agency
would undertake a newer, bolder, more far-reaching agenda in the
Pertschuk era.
Pertschuk and his leadership team were not indifferent to
implementation issues. They pressed onward with efforts to upgrade
the agency’s talent and to invest in building the knowledge base
that would support new FTC programs.368 The agency also tried to
simplify the prosecution of new matters in light of knowledge gain-
ed from previous experiences with case management.369 As noted
above, by the end of the 1970s the agency was taking steps to
understand why its fortunes, and the role of competition policy, had
risen and fallen at different times in the FTC’s history.370
Despite these admirable initiatives, the FTC in the 1970s and
during the Pertschuk chairmanship systematically underestimated
the implementation issues and problems associated with major
extensions of the FTC’s programs.371 Perhaps the single principal
lapse was the failure to develop a system, from 1969 onward, that
tested each new project proposal on its own terms and in the context
of the agency’s entire portfolio372: What did the agency expect to
gain? What were the risks of failure? Who would do the proposed
project? How long would it take? What would it cost? How did the
project affect the risk and difficulty of the entire portfolio?373
One has to ask why the FTC did not give implementation issues
more emphasis in deciding whether to initiate new litigation or rule-
making matters in the 1970s. One factor may have been the acute
pressure the FTC felt to be seen as making massive, immediate
367. See Ernest Gellhorn, The Wages of Zealotry: The FTC Under Siege, REGULATION,
Jan./Feb. 1980, at 33, 39; William E. Kovacic, The Antitrust Paradox Revisited: Robert Bork
and the Transformation of Modern Antitrust Policy, 36 WAYNE L. REV. 1413, 1431-33 (1990);
Kovacic & Hyman, supra note 349, at 305, 308-09; supra Part I.B.
368. Efforts to upgrade the agency’s talent began before Pertschuk was Commissioner. See
Kovacic, supra note 78, at 649; see also Gould, supra note 366 (describing management
reforms initiated by Pertschuk at FTC in 1977).
369. See Kovacic, supra note 78, at 659-60 (explaining ways in which the FTC worked to
improve case management).
370. See supra notes 269-70 and accompanying text.
371. See William E. Kovacic, Rating the Competition Agencies: What Constitutes Good
Performance?, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 903, 922-23 (2009).
372. See Kovacic & Hyman, supra note 349, at 307-08.
373. See Kovacic, supra note 351, at 21-24.
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progress toward the realization of the performance standard (set out
most clearly in the ABA Report) that had to be satisfied to justify
the agency’s continued existence.374 The ABA and Nader Reports
portrayed the FTC as a badly failed regulatory authority, beset by
dull-witted leadership, shot through with weak managers and
mediocre staff, oblivious to decades of criticism, and preoccupied
with fishing for commercial minnows.375 Congress echoed this grim
assessment and repeated the ABA panel’s admonition that this was
the agency’s final chance to prove its worth.376 The agency needed to
launch big initiatives—quickly and in large numbers.377 Even as the
agency sought to ramp up its program in the early 1970s, key
legislators reminded the agency that the output of seemingly
massive new matters was not enough.378
Pertschuk himself would have felt this pressure. He was a
product of a legislative environment that helped set stratospheric
goals for the FTC.379 By the time he arrived at the FTC, he had
become a leading figure in a public interest community that re-
lentlessly demanded that regulators do more and undervalued what
regulators actually did.380 If an agency landed on the Moon, the
public interest community immediately asked why the regulator
had yet to land on Mars. This community viewed any signs of
374. See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 23, at 3.
375. See supra Part I.A.
376. See Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 9, at 1957, 1964.
377. See id. at 1966.
378. See id. at 1966-67. This state of mind is captured in comments that Senator William
Proxmire made to FTC Chairman, Lewis Engman, in a hearing convened by the Joint
Economic Committee of Congress in November 1974. Market Power, the Federal Trade
Commission, and Inflation: Hearing Before the J. Econ. Comm., 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 58-59
(1974) [hereinafter FTC Hearing]. At the time of the hearing, the FTC was running its shared
monopolization cases against the breakfast cereal and petroleum industries and its
monopolization case against Xerox. See supra notes 308-09 and accompanying text. Powerful
structural relief was the FTC’s stated objective in all three matters. See supra notes 117-20
and accompanying text. Against this background, Proxmire told Engman: “[T]he FTC, like a
number of other regulator agencies seems to concern itself with minor infractions of the law,
and to spend much of its time on cases of small consequence.” FTC Hearing, supra, at 59.
379. See Gellhorn, supra note 367, at 33. See generally PERTSCHUK, supra note 11.
380. See PERTSCHUK, supra note 11 (describing the enactment of consumer legislation in
the 1960s and 1970s and efforts by congressional committees to press regulatory agencies to
implement the legislation effectively); see also HARRIS & MILKIS, supra note 10, at 160-61, 170-
71, 179-80 (describing the rise of consumer advocacy); LOUIS M. KOHLMEIER, JR., THE
REGULATORS 251-61 (1969) (arguing that the FTC focused on trivial matters rather than
issues such as industrial mergers).
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compromise or hesitation as betrayals of the public interest cause.381
Pertschuk doubtlessly observed how key figures of the public
interest community visited their wrath on others whom Jimmy
Carter had appointed from its ranks to serve in key regulatory
posts.382 Long personal relationships and the demonstrated fidelity
of these individuals to the public interest cause counted for nothing
if the newly appointed regulators were seen to waver in any
respect.383 For this audience, spoken concerns about policy imple-
mentation and agency capability were threadbare excuses for in-
action.384 With courage and more funding, any aim was attainable.385
Another factor is the calculus that individual leaders use to
decide how much the agency should invest, respectively, in new
matters (such as cases or rules) and in building institutional
capability to perform such matters effectively.386 Ideally, agency
leadership strives to achieve an appropriate balance between the
381. See, e.g., COX ET AL., supra note 21, at 62-65 (criticizing the FTC’s policy of voluntary
enforcement to allow businesses to fix their behavior).
382. In one memorable episode, Ralph Nader accused his long-time colleague, Joan
Claybrook, of betraying the cause of consumer protection in her role as a Carter
Administration appointee to head the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). See
Ernest Holsendolph, Nader Calls on Ex-Colleague to Resign Safety Post, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1,
1977), https://www.nytimes.com/1977/12/01/archives/nader-calls-on-excolleague-to-resign-
safety-post.html [https://perma.cc/2BRV-BTA4]. Until her appointment to head the NTSB,
Claybrook had lead Congress Watch, the main lobbying arm of the Nader organization. See
id. Nader described Claybrook’s tenure as “a trail of averted or broken promises” and accused
her of “a failure of nerve.” Id.
383. Nader’s attack on Claybrook is illustrative. Nader scolded her for not moving fast
enough and far enough with measures to introduce requirements that automobile
manufacturers install air bags in all vehicles. See id. Journalists recounted how Nader was
criticizing consumer advocates who had taken positions in the Carter Administration but had
failed to meet Nader’s expectations. See, e.g., id. One story quoted Nader as saying “My
personal feelings about them are not at stake.... The issues are bigger than that.” Id.
384. When challenged by Nader to be more aggressive, Joan Claybrook pointed out that her
agency was understaffed and had “a long way to go.” See id. The response did not persuade
Nader, who said the only appropriate response to the Secretary of Transportation’s decision
to delay implementation of various safety measures was Claybrook’s resignation. See id.
385. See Kovacic, supra note 349, at 885. During the early 1970s, Congress raised the
FTC’s budget from $16.9 million to $47.2 million to allow the FTC to pursue a more ambitious
agenda. See id. Legislators seemed to assume that greater resources could immediately be
translated into highly capable teams of analysts and case handlers. This overlooked the time
it takes for an agency to recruit superior personnel, train the teams, and acquire the
experience needed to carry out ambitious tasks.
386. See generally Kovacic & Hyman, supra note 349 (discussing the need to balance these
two priorities).
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two.387 On the one hand, a leader must recognize the importance of
activity in performing the agency’s mandate—to prosecute viola-
tions, to deter future misconduct, and to demonstrate the agency’s
legitimacy in the eyes of the public that provides the resources it
deploys.388 On the other hand, a leader must understand the
principal mentioned earlier: successful performance of ambitious
programs requires the application of skills and knowledge equal to
the task.389 Building these skills and knowledge requires invest-
ments that do not yield immediately observable results.390 The
necessary capability will not emerge unless incumbent leaders make
investments that will largely benefit their successors.391 Incumbent
leaders who are mainly interested in their own future advancement
may emphasize investments in new initiatives that generate
immediate credit-claiming opportunities and de-emphasize invest-
ments that improve agency capability.392
Pertschuk struggled to achieve a good balance between “consump-
tion” in the form of new cases and “investment” in the form of
outlays that build institutional capability.393 Despite his expressed
intention to do more, his output of new matters lagged behind the
pace set by his predecessors from 1969 through 1976.394 His
investment in institutional capability grew beyond prevailing
levels.395 Pertschuk’s predecessors began too many ambitious mat-
ters without proper concern for effective implementation, and
387. See id. at 322.
388. See, e.g., William E. Kovacic & Marianela Lopez-Galdos, Lifecycles of Competition
Systems: Explaining Variation in the Implementation of New Regimes, 79 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 85, 94-95 (2016) (explaining how the pursuit of a minimum critical mass of
enforcement cases is necessary for an agency to be deemed credible and legitimate).
389. See Kovacic & Hyman, supra note 349, at 299-313.
390. See id. at 304.
391. See id. at 296.
392. See id. at 304-05; Kovacic & Hyman, supra note 349, at 914, 921-22.
393. See Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 9, at 1973; see Kovacic & Hyman, supra note 349,
at 311-12.
394. While Pertschuk’s output of new matters lagged behind the pace of his predecessors,
many of the matters initiated by predecessors were ongoing during Pertschuk’s tenure and
demanded substantial resources. See Kovacic & Hyman, supra note 349, at 309-11 (listing
some of the ongoing matters in the 1970s).
395. See Kovacic, supra note 78, at 659-64 (discussing developments within the FTC).
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Pertschuk tended to receive the blame when many of those matters
collapsed in the late 1970s and early 1980s.396
On the whole, one can see Pertschuk being pulled by two con-
flicting forces. One force pressed him to expand the agency’s pro-
grams aggressively; the other called for significant upgrades in
capability to do the job well. As he took office, he faced a political
imperative to announce a new and bolder agenda.397 Given his
professional background and his fidelity to the goals of the public
interest community,398 he would have found it impossible to say
something along the following lines:
I expect to do more at the FTC and to employ a broader concep-
tion of competition policy. At the same time, I am mindful of the
number and magnitude of competition and consumer protection
matters the FTC already has in motion. In light of those
commitments, and the difficulties we are facing in delivering on
the existing agenda, I will be somewhat cautious in adding new
matters to the list.399
Had Pertschuk said that, various legislators and members of the
public interest community would have demanded his head.400
In practice, Pertschuk turned out to be more restrained in adding
new initiatives than his Boston and Atlanta speeches foreshad-
owed.401 The evident difficulties faced by the agency in delivering on
existing projects, and Pertschuk’s belated awareness that the
political environment was turning against him, inspired him to
scale down some of his earlier plans.402 At the same time, he did not
back away from making investments to enhance the agency’s
capability.403 One wonders what might have happened if more of this
investment had taken place early in his chairmanship—for example,
396. See Kovacic & Hyman, supra note 349, at 305, 307, 309 (discussing the collapse of the
Exxon and Kellogg shared monopolization cases, both of which began before Pertschuk’s
tenure).
397. See supra notes 374-85 and accompanying text.
398. See supra notes 379-85 and accompanying text.
399. Cf. supra notes 386-92 and accompanying text.
400. Cf. supra notes 374-85 and accompanying text.
401. Compare supra notes 380-81 and accompanying text, with supra Part II.A.1, and supra
notes 219-23 and accompanying text.
402. See supra Part IV.B; supra notes 394, 396 and accompanying text.
403. See supra notes 263-71, 368-69, 395 and accompanying text.
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the historians’ seminar on the history of competition law in the
United States404 or the research on the evolution of FTC enforce-
ment and its political implications405—rather than later in his term.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR A NEW OVERHAUL OF U.S. COMPETITION
POLICY
As noted in the Introduction, a number of contemporary proposals
aim to make the FTC the engine for a transformation of U.S. com-
petition policy.406 Many of these proposals resemble the program
that Michael Pertschuk set out in his Boston and Atlanta speeches.
A number of similarities stand out.
First the current call for a dramatic redirection of policy is
grounded in a narrative of calamitous system failure.407 Among
other lapses, the modern critique argues that U.S. competition
policy since the 1970s has squandered precious resources on trivial
matters (notably, the prosecution of horizontal restraints cases
involving small, poorly paid service providers);408 shied away from
challenging dominant firms and industries characterized by
collective dominance;409 ignored the destructive consequences of
vertical integration;410 and tolerated mergers that increased
concentration or allowed dominant incumbents to absorb smaller
firms that, as independent enterprises, could emerge as major
competitive forces.411
404. See supra note 270 and accompanying text.
405. See supra note 269 and accompanying text.
406. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
407. See generally JONATHAN TEPPER, THE MYTH OF CAPITALISM: MONOPOLIES AND THE
DEATH OF COMPETITION (2019); TIM WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE GILDED
AGE (2018).
408. See Khan, supra note 6 (calling the FTC “an agency adrift” that is “squandering
resources on trivial cases”); Sandeep Vaheesan, America’s Most Insidious Union Buster? Its
Own Government, GUARDIAN (June 29, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/commentisfree/2018/jun/29/america-insidious-union-buster-government [https://
perma.cc/R645-9T4C] (criticizing DOJ and FTC for bringing cases that attack efforts by work-
ers and small-and-medium enterprises, such as music teachers, to raise wage levels).
409. See WU, supra note 407, at 102-26; Trustbusting in the 21st Century, ECONOMIST, Nov.
17, 2018, at 55.
410. See Khan, supra note 6.
411. See Germán Gutiérrez & Thomas Philippon, You’re Paying More in America Than You
Would in Europe, WASH. POST (Aug. 13, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the
worldpost/wp/2018/08/13/middle-class/?utm_term=.619c7f364558 [https://perma.cc/PBV9-
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A major stated cause of these policy distortions has been a
fundamental misconception of the proper aims of competition policy.
Consumer interests, under the banner of “consumer welfare,” have
displaced the egalitarian vision of a fairness-based competition
policy that Congress embraced in adopting the Sherman, Clayton,
and FTC Acts and the federal courts effectuated, especially from the
late 1930s into the 1970s.412 The cramped, single-minded focus on
consumer interests is attacked for excluding consideration of the
interests of workers, small and medium enterprises, income dis-
tribution effects, and the welfare of communities devastated by
capricious choices made by dominant enterprises.413 The consumer
welfare fixation on price effects is scorned for ignoring how restric-
tive practices and sheer corporate size undermine innovation and
endanger a host of other values.414 The misshapen contemporary
goals structure is assailed for being so tolerant of corporate gi-
gantism that it undermines democracy itself.415
In a number of instances, the litany of competition policy failures
merges with a parallel critique of modern consumer protection
policy. This is another narrative of grave inadequacy, in no area
DFWL]; Steven Pearlstein, Boeing and Airbus, the New ‘Super Duopoly,’ WASH. POST (Apr.
25, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2018/04/25/boeing-and-airbus-the-
new-super-duopoly/?utm_term=.a9f11b4bfe03 [https://perma.cc/NNB4-SE74] (discussing the
lack of governmental challenges to mergers within the aerospace industry).
412. See William E. Kovacic, The Modern Evolution of U.S. Competition Policy Enforcement
Norms, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 377, 464-67 (2003) [hereinafter Kovacic, Modern Evolution]
(describing modern acceptance by U.S. federal antitrust agencies of an efficiency-oriented
goals framework); William E. Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of Modern U.S. Competition Law
for Dominant Firm Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix, 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV.
1, 34-35 [hereinafter Kovacic, Double Helix] (describing contributions of Chicago and Harvard
School scholars to development of an efficiency-oriented U.S. antitrust goals framework). 
413. See supra notes 408-11 and accompanying text; see also Lina Khan & Sandeep
Vaheesan, Market Power and Inequality: The Antitrust Counterrevolution and Its Discontents,
11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 235, 269-72, 277-79 (2017).
414. See Lina M. Khan, Note, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 737-39
(2017); Marshall Steinbaum, The Consumer Welfare Standard Is an Outdated Holdover from
a Discredited Economic Theory, ROOSEVELT INST. (Dec. 11, 2017), http://www.rooseveltinsti
tute.org/consumer-welfare-standard-outdated-holdover-discredited-economic-theory/ [https://
perma.cc/N9E7-YG8B].
415. See Wu, supra note 407, at 138-39; Russell Brandom, The Anti-Monopoly Case Against
Google: A Conversation with Open Markets’ Barry Lynn, VERGE (Sept. 5, 2017, 2:55 PM),
https://www.theverge.com/2017/9/5/16243868/google-monopoly-antitrust-open-markets-barry-
lynn [https://perma.cc/68K9-9S2D].
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more telling than the indifference to the collection and misuse of
personal data collected by large information technology firms.416
The new critique derives strength from more frequent expressions
of concern by elected officials and candidates for public office.417
Some demand closer regulatory scrutiny of existing commercial
giants;418 others call for a program to break up these enterprises into
smaller firms.419 Proposals to accomplish these or related ends
through new legislation have appeared in statements by individuals
and groups within the major political parties.420 Given the difficul-
ties inherent in adopting legislation of this scope, one imagines that
litigation would remain the policy tool of choice for the coming
years.
Suppose that the advocates of the transformation sketched above
get the opportunity they wish for. Political developments align to
416. See Roger McNamee, I Mentored Mark Zuckerberg. I Loved Facebook. But I Can’t Stay
Silent About What’s Happening, TIME (Jan. 17, 2019), http://time.com/5505441/mark-
zuckerberg-mentor-facebook-downfall [https://perma.cc/TV9P-UWBF].
417. See Rhys Blakely, Tech Titans, Once the Darlings of US Politics, Are Recast as
Enemies, TIMES (LONDON), Sept. 23, 2017, at 46; Rana Foroohar, Silicon Valley ‘Superstars’
Risk a Populist Backlash, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/3349ef84-
268c-11e7-a34a-538b4cb30025 [https://perma.cc/JH8B-7HH4]; Ron Knox, Elizabeth Warren
Is the Perfect Antitrust Crusader for 2020, SLATE (Jan. 4, 2019, 3:24 PM), https://slate.com/
news-and-politics/2019/01/elizabeth-warren-2020-antitrust-monopoly-crusader.html [https://
perma.cc/UBA6-X73T].
418. See, e.g., Haley Sweetland Edwards, Washington Takes on the Threat of Big Tech,
TIME (Sept. 6, 2018), http://time.com/5388338/dc-google-facebook-twitter/ [https://perma.cc/
4V98-W6HN]; Seth Fiegerman, Facebook Faces New Regulatory Backlash over Data Privacy,
CNN TECH (June 4, 2018, 1:28 PM), https://money.cnn.com/2018/06/04/technology/facebook-
data-backlash/index.html [https://perma.cc/XE66-RK7F].
419. See, e.g., WU, supra note 407, at 127-39; Robert Reich, Break Up Facebook (and While
We’re At It, Google, Apple and Amazon), GUARDIAN (Nov. 20, 2018, 3:00 PM), https://www.the
guardian.com/commentisfree/2018/nov/20/facebook-google-antitrust-laws-gilded-age [https://
perma.cc/XD8P-UXWA] (“We should break up the hi-tech behemoths, or at least require they
make their proprietary technology and data publicly available and share their platforms with
smaller companies.”); Matt Stoller, The Return of Monopoly, NEW REPUBLIC (July 13, 2017),
https://newrepublic.com/article/143595/return-monopoly-amazon-rise-business-tycoon-white-
house-democrats-return-party-trust-busting-roots [https://perma.cc/DCR2-K5Q3]; Jonathan
Tepper, We Are All Losing Out as Corporate Concentration Grows, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2018),
https://www.ft.com/content/20801f16-f1a3-11e8-938a-543765795f99 [https://perma.cc/38RR-
UGSX].
420. See, e.g., Customer Online Notification for Stopping Edge-provider Network
Transgressions Act, S. 2639, 115th Cong. (as introduced in Senate, Apr. 10, 2018); Katy
Steinmetz, Congress Never Wanted to Regulate Facebook. Until Now, TIME (Apr. 12, 2018),
http://time.com/5237432/congress-never-wanted-to-regulate-facebook-until-now/ [https://
perma.cc/7222-R4N8].
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elect a President and a Congress that embraces a redirection along
the lines laid out above. The President appoints and the Senate
confirms agency leaders committed to a program including the
following elements:
1. Abandonment of an efficiency-based consumer welfare
orientation of competition policy and its replacement with a
conception of “competition policy in its broadest sense,” encom-
passing the interests of citizens as consumers, workers, and
community residents who desire the protections afforded by a
broad range of policy commands including areas such as en-
vironmental protection, health and safety legislation;421
2. Primary emphasis on litigation programs to challenge
individual dominant firms and tight oligopolies, with routine
recourse to structural remedies to deconcentrate affected
sectors, including efforts to unravel mergers that the federal
agencies improvidently cleared or approved subject to inade-
quate remedies;422
3. Severe curtailment of advocacy programs that challenge oc-
cupational licensure restrictions and of current litigation efforts
to cut back on the reach of the state action doctrine;423
4. Reform of existing horizontal restraints litigation programs to
repudiate cases that (a) challenged efforts by low-wage service
providers to raise their fees,424 and (b) rejected defenses predi-
cated on the preservation of product or service quality;425
5. Revision of the Department of Justice criminal anticartel
program to allow smaller enterprises to present defenses based
on the preservation of employment levels;426
6. Expanded reliance on theories that challenge vertical inte-
gration by contract or ownership;
421. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
422. Cf. supra Part I.B.1.
423. For an example of such litigation, see N.C. Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct.
1101 (2015).
424. See, e.g., supra note 408 and accompanying text.
425. This result would flow from an expansion of the antitrust goals framework to give
greater emphasis to product quality and to deemphasize the concern about price effects.
426. By this approach, small enterprises would be able to raise, as a defense to illegality,
the argument that their agreement to set prices or to allocate markets or customers served
the beneficial social purpose of ensuring an adequate flow of work to all of the firms. 
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7. Restoration of Robinson-Patman Act enforcement as a core
element of federal antitrust policy;427
8. Strict opposition to mergers whose concentrative effect
exceeds levels set by the U.S. Department of Justice Merger
Guidelines issued in 1968;428 in merger matters, the government
will adhere to the policy aims set out in the Supreme Court’s
decision in 1962 of Brown Shoe v. United States;429 and
9. The routine use by the FTC of Section 5 of the FTC Act to
overcome doctrinal limitations imposed by existing Sherman Act
and Clayton Act jurisprudence that embraces a consumer wel-
fare standard and unduly confines the interpretation of these
statutes.430
The implementation of the program at the federal antitrust agencies
will require the appointment of senior managers and new staff who
repudiate the consumer welfare standard and embrace the multi-
dimensional conception of the proper goals of competition law.431
Those already employed by the enforcement agencies as managers
and staff will be expected to accept the expanded goals framework
or they will find their duties reduced and their roles marginalized.
New appointees to top leadership positions will not be tainted by
substantial previous experience in the private sector, nor will they
have spent too much time as civil servants in a government en-
forcement culture that assumed the primacy of consumer welfare as
the aim of antitrust law.432 The concern about compromised motives
also is likely to disqualify academics who, though sympathetic to
some expansion of antitrust enforcement, remain excessively
beholden to some notion of a consumer (rather than citizen) welfare
standard,433 or have consulting practices that have engaged them
427. The ABA previously recommended that the FTC significantly curtail its Robinson-
Patman Act enforcement. See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 23, at 67-68.
428. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 1968 Merger Guidelines, reprinted in Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
¶ 13,101, 2016 WL 6107271.
429. 370 U.S. 294, 315-23, 322 n.38 (1961).
430. See, e.g., supra notes 215-18 and accompanying text.
431. See supra notes 361-62 and accompanying text.
432. See Trustbusting in the 21st Century, supra note 409, at 10 (stating that “competition
regulators have been captured” and criticizing the U.S. revolving door that creates conflicts
of interest and warped perspectives on competition policy).
433. In 2018, the Yale Law Journal published a set of papers which, in general, proposed
an expansion of antitrust enforcement premised upon the application of concepts already
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in acting for defendants in antitrust cases.434 The “do-more-with-
what-we-have” proponents of some extension of enforcement will be
dismissed as excessively timid or hopelessly centrist, and the
somewhat proenforcement academics with too much experience
representing defendants will bear much the same stigma as private
practitioners in economic consultancies or law firms. 
 The demand for a single-minded, uncompromised vision of ex-
pansive enforcement will lead to a different pool of leadership
candidates. New appointees to top leadership and senior manage-
ment positions at the DOJ and the FTC will be drawn chiefly from
nongovernment public interest organizations, state attorneys gen-
eral antitrust units that adopted an expansive view of competition
policy, and from university faculties (but not academics who consult
extensively for private parties).
As noted above, the means for the redirection of competition
policy will be the prosecution of large numbers of major cases.435 In
this framework, there will be no room for smaller matters.436 Given
the intensity of the modern inadequacy narrative and the expecta-
tion of sweeping reform, there will be strong demands for a high
tempo of prosecutions.437 The elected officials and advocacy groups
who demand and support this transformation of competition policy
will have no patience for temporizing or half-measures.438 Those
recognized by existing jurisprudence and related scholarship. Collection: Unlocking Anti-
trust Enforcement, 127 YALE L.J. 1916 (2018). A leading advocate of a more sweeping
transformation of the U.S. competition law system criticized the authors for failing to ques-
tion the basic goals framework that animates modern antitrust policy. Lina M. Khan, The
Ideological Roots of America’s Market Power Problem, 127 YALE L.J. F. 960 (2018) (“While the
‘Unlocking Antitrust Enforcement’ Collection offers some useful suggestions for how to
strengthen enforcement, they neglect to grapple with the current framework, ratifying an
orientation and set of assumptions that ultimately undermine their project.”).
434. See Jonathan Tepper, Why Regulators Went Soft on Monopolies, AM. CONSERVATIVE,
(Jan. 9, 2019) (criticizing revolving door that moves individuals between the government and
external organizations where they represent or consult for private firms, and singling out
various academics), https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/why-the-regulators-
went-soft-on-monopolies/ [https://perma.cc/ZGG9-7QRC].
435. Cf. supra notes 374-77 and accompanying text (noting similar expectations that
Pertschuk faced during his chairmanship).
436. Cf. supra notes 374-77 and accompanying text.
437. Cf. supra notes 374-85 and accompanying text (describing a similar narrative of the
FTC during the 1970s).
438. Cf. supra notes 376-78 and accompanying text (describing a similar level of impatience
expressed by members of Congress towards the FTC during the 1970s).
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who waver from a total commitment to the agenda may face a wrath
comparable to the opprobrium Ralph Nader unleashed upon former
colleagues whose zeal he found wanting during the Carter adminis-
tration.439
The experience of Michael Pertschuk’s FTC chairmanship, and
the experience of the FTC in the 1970s more generally, suggests
what the newly transformed FTC might expect as it attempts to roll
out the new policy agenda.440 One certainty is the difficulty of policy
implementation.441 The types of cases contemplated by the program
outlined above will elicit strong resistance from the affected firms,
which will amass large teams of accomplished lawyers and econom-
ic advisors to assist them.442 How long will it take the newly re-
oriented federal agencies to develop litigation teams to match the
skills that the defendants will bring to the case—not just for one or
a few cases, but the many high-stakes cases that the new program
will call for?443 The political overseers and public interest commu-
nity are likely to brush aside excuses about implementation dif-
ficulties.444 The pressures to deliver the new agenda will create
serious dangers of a mismatch between commitments and capa-
bilities—the same condition that befell the FTC in the 1970s and
caused many of its flagship cases and rules to perish.445
The cases will be litigated before judges who are generally pre-
disposed to accept the consumer welfare framework, either by per-
sonal preference or by a felt compulsion to abide by forty years of
jurisprudence that tells them to do so.446 A new president gradual-
ly could change the philosophy of the federal courts by appointing
judges sympathetic to the aims of the proposed transformation.447
The reorientation of the courts through judicial appointments could
439. See supra notes 388-90 and accompanying text.
440. See supra Part IV.B-C.
441. See supra Part IV.C.
442. See Kovacic, supra note 351, at 22; supra notes 353, 364, 367, and accompanying text.
443. See generally supra notes 361-64 and accompanying text.
444. See supra notes 377-81 and accompanying text.
445. See supra Part IV.C.
446. See Kovacic, supra note 349, at 1450-51, 1468-69 (describing the widespread
acceptance of the consumer welfare framework by the federal judiciary).
447. Cf. id. at 1468-69 (noting the impact of President Reagan and President Bush on the
acceptance of the consumer welfare framework); Kovacic, Double Helix, supra note 412
(describing diverse intellectual influences that support today’s consumer welfare consensus).
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take a long time.448 In the interim, the agencies will face a doctrinal
status quo that does not embrace competition law in its broadest
sense.449
A possible antidote to the rigidities of existing jurisprudence is
new legislation that directs the courts to apply the desired goals
framework and changes various substantive standards. Such leg-
islation would be a major undertaking, and it would elicit strong
opposition from affected firms and industries.450 The affected busi-
ness interests would mobilize all of the electoral resources available
to them under the existing framework of lobbying and campaign
financing.451 Legislative relief from existing jurisprudential stric-
tures might take years to accomplish.
The last consideration focuses attention on the likely durability
and commitment of the electoral coalition that demands a redirec-
tion of competition policy and supports the overhaul of the enforce-
ment agencies. The history of the FTC and the Pertschuk era show
how political coalitions can be volatile, unpredictable, and evanes-
cent.452 Will the coalitions endure long enough—perhaps five to ten
years—to support the agency through the entire life cycle of major
litigation matters? Will the coalition of legislators who favor com-
petition policy in its broadest sense resist the enormous political
pressure that will be brought to bear—especially by firms within
their own constituencies—once the full magnitude of the new pro-
gram becomes apparent?453
CONCLUSION
The FTC’s experience from the 1970s does not predetermine the
outcome of a modern effort to reorient competition policy in a new
time and a new place. The events of Michael Petschuk’s chairman-
ship may or may not reoccur in some form. Yet these experiences
448. Cf. id. (noting that presidents typically only appoint approximately 20 to 25 percent
of the federal bench over a four-year period).
449. Cf. id.
450. See Kovacic, supra note 351, at 22; supra notes 353, 364, 367, and accompanying text.
451. See Kovacic, supra note 351, at 22; supra notes 353, 364, 367, and accompanying text.
452. See supra notes 379-84 and accompanying text.
453. Cf. supra notes 331-48 and accompanying text (noting the significant change of opin-
ion in Congress during the 1970s towards the FTC’s competition policy).
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point to important institutional considerations that warrant atten-
tion in contemplating a journey into difficult seas; it makes sense to
learn about navigational hazards that other mariners have encoun-
tered in the past, and to study how they sought to surmount them.
The FTC of the 1970s suffered greatly because it lacked effective
mechanisms to maintain a good fit between program commitments
and capabilities to deliver, and to anticipate political backlash that
major cases and rulemaking proceedings would elicit. There was no
lack of trying, but there was too little attention to “the problem of
implementation, that is, the path between the preferred solution
and the actual performance of the government.”454 The FTC expe-
rience of the 1970s and the Pertschuk chairmanship deserve a close
look if future Commission leadership attempts to build a new pro-
gram to realize competition policy in its broadest sense.
454. GRAHAM T. ALLISON, THE ESSENCE OF DECISION: EXPLAINING THE CUBAN MISSILE
CRISIS 267-68 (1970).
